

PARSE

01 ISSUE

Judgement

**Christian Boltanski | Simon Critchley, Mick Wilson and
Andrea Phillips | Mine Dogantan-Dack | Maria Lind |
Maria Fusco | Ruth Herz | Rainer Ganahl**

**Issue Editors
Ingrid Elam, Johan Öberg and Henk Slager**



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Conversation Christian Boltanski, Paris, March 12 2014

Editors' note: By way of a preface to this, the first issue of a new journal on artistic research, we begin with a moment of encounter with the artist Christian Boltanski, where we asked him to reflect on the question of judgement.

CHRISTIAN BOLTANSKI

Christian Boltanski is a photographer, painter, sculptor, and installation artist. The child of a Ukrainian Jewish father and a Corsican mother, Boltanski's early years were marked by the Nazi occupation of France, which forced his father to go into hiding. His work deals with the concepts of loss, memory, childhood, and death, often functioning as memorials or shrines to collective cultural rituals and events. Many of his installations may reference the lives lost in the Holocaust, striking both societal and personal chords. During the 1970s Boltanski participated in a number of important shows, exhibiting at the Musée d'art moderne de la Ville de Paris (1970); *Documenta 5* in Kassel, Germany (1972); Staatliche Kunsthalle Baden-Baden, Germany (1973); and *Venice*

Biennale Architettura (1975). Since the 1970s he has participated in many other important exhibitions, including *Documenta 8*, Kassel (1987), and more recently has had solo shows at the Institut Mathildenhöhe, Darmstadt, Germany (2006); La maison rouge, Fondation Antoine de Galbert, Paris (2008); and Kunstmuseum Lichtenstein, Vaduz (2009). He received the Kaiserring prize from the city of Goslar, Germany (2001), and the Nord/LB, Braunschweig art prize later that same year. He was awarded the Praemium Imperiale for sculpture by the Japan Art Association (2006). Boltanski lives and works in the Malakoff neighborhood of Paris with his wife, Annette Messager, with whom he occasionally collaborates on projects.

THINK I WAS VERY TOLERANT. I had very few students. I am not optimistic enough. If the students left me, it was perhaps because I was too depressed. I was very nice. I always accepted everybody. Everyone who wanted to be in my atelier I always accepted. And I tried to be very nice with everybody. But, after some time, people left. In my atelier, there were no chairs. Everybody was sitting on the floor. And most of the time there was only one student, and sometimes I was alone during two hours. They expected somebody who knew the truth and could explain the truth in an easy way. And give some rules: To have success you must do that. I refuse to have assistants. Because, if you have assistants, you must give them something to do everyday. And then you must repeat yourself, because you have no new ideas. And I cannot have an assistant because I have a new idea only every two years. It is always the same idea... What I try to do is to do something in a place that is not directly a cultural place... and someone arrives... who doesn't understand anything of contemporary art, and who is touched, and who doesn't understand if it is art or not art, but only is touched. That's what I want. You know, I told you, I am a bad preacher. I believe that in our fate we have a part of all the people who lived before us... A kind of a puzzle. And I believe that our spirit is also full of all the people that were before us. I have a lot of people who lived before me, but I am sure I have a rabbi. And I can be a rabbi. I shall be a bad rabbi... but a rabbi. But I am sure that a part of me is also a Corsican farmer. And a part of me is a Mongol. My brother the sociologist is very political. And he is a great sociologist and a very clever man. But I am not political at all. In a way I am very conservative. And it is also because I want to be only an artist. If you go into politics, it is so funny that you might forget to be an artist. I don't like cars. I don't like holidays. I wake up in the morning – and it is time to think

about art! There is food, and there is sex and so on. But I can't be involved in something too important. To be married with an artist is awful. But I cannot be married to someone who is not an artist. With Annette we have a lot of rules. I never go into her studio. The last time she was in my studio was perhaps ten years ago. We have two separate homes. If she buys a book, she is not going to say to me "I have bought this book". I am afraid, because I know she is clever. And I know she is going to speak the truth. You know. I can lie. It is very easy for me to be a great artist with you. With her, I can't. She knows exactly that I am stupid and a crook and... I cared about the judgement of Szeeman, of four or five people. Now I don't know... only about the judgement of my own. And now I am so old. You know what is marvellous with being so old? I will die soon. I don't care. I have enough money to survive until I die. I don't need to sell anymore. I don't care to be at the Venice Biennale. I care to go there, but not to be there. Everything is done. And now, I am very free. I can do what I want. And I am lucky, because I can choose to do a piece in the middle of the desert of Chile... I really believe that I am going to die soon. And I have so many shows programmed for the next year. I am so busy I can't die; I have no time to die. I must survive. It is a way to survive to take appointments with a lot of people. I love life. You can't imagine! Everybody thinks I am sad. You can't imagine how light I am. I love to eat. I love to have fun. I love life in a bad way. It is too much, you know. I spent a large part of my youth in cars, together with my parents. I looked out. I was in love with a little girl. I never spoke to her, but I can see her walking everyday at eleven o'clock. I was looking. Many years ago I was in New York, at Grand Central and it was six o'clock and I saw all those people who were going home from work and each of them had a story. Someone is happy with his girlfriend, someone has been fighting with his boss. I wished to go into the spirit of all these peo-

ple and to love them and to know that everybody can give me so much. At my first show in Japan, everybody said you are so Japanese because I told them something they knew. The Parisian taxi drivers... most of them are not nice. Most of them are awful. But if you begin to talk to them you find a lot of people who are quite nice. One who is in love with Marguerite Duras, mystic people, etc. If you find the right way to go, everyone is marvellous, everyone loves you so much. I can't speak about Bourdieu because I never read a book of Bourdieu. I don't like Bourdieu. I don't think that everyone who has lived in a poor family can't speak about Duras. There is always someone. There is always someone who is different. That is the problem that I have with my sociologist brother: I don't believe in evil. I believe that everybody is nice. All of us are criminals. See what happens in Syria, and we do nothing. We know that. We are not going to change our lives for that. All of us are criminals, but not at the same level. And the Nazis were very sweet people. What I can say is that I am deeply involved in the art of my generation and the generation before. You are involved with your generation and with people 10-to-20 years before, but not 30 years before. I like very much that the theatre goes into the art scene. I like that very much: theatre in the arts. I love painting. I love van Gogh and Artaud. The problem with Bill Viola is that the older you get, the more you want to talk about serious things, and you become pompous. And the pieces he did before were really good, and now they are becoming a little pompous. And I am afraid for myself to be like that. "I am very old now, and now I know what is life" – that is very dangerous.

WE MEET CHRISTIAN BOLTANSKI ON the bridge leading to the *Conservatoire national de Paris*. This is Paris – and he is surrounded by an enthusiastic group of people from the research school of the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, the head of the composition department of the *Conservatoire*, friends, admirers and *auditeurs libres*.

There is a big dark seminar room in the basement of the building. Students and doctorands are waiting. Boltanski speaks about placing public art in semi-concealed spaces, reacts, gives elaborate answers to questions from the students, always ambivalent, always attentive, re-enacting. The discourse floats wonderfully, tautologically, empathically and paradoxically, oscillating between the pole of *history/sociology/disenchantment* on the one hand and *poiesis/praxis/life* on the other.

Boltanski is always in the opposite camp. The economy here is about doxa and paradoxa. "Art produces the key that doesn't fit anywhere". That key – which is *the human* – is also the key concept of his art and cannot be defined by difference and identity, only by a never-ending *différance*, a *deferred difference* or differing deference: contemplation.

The conversation goes on, the pendulum moves slowly back and forth between poetics and aesthetics, construction and deconstruction, history and person, judgement and pardon, recognition and discovery, fetishism and dismantling of the *illutio*... Here, there is only discrepancy and postponed judgement.

Deferring judgement we descend and enter the installation *La Réserve du Conservatoire de Musique* – a closed crypt some 20 meters under earth. The "dead", the applicants who were rejected and therefore not registered in the archives of the *Conservatoire*, have been on show here since the opening of the *Conservatoire* in 1991 – but the place has only rarely been visited since.

A dark corridor. Walls and floors of concrete. Dust and sand on the floor. Protection/imprisonment. Along the left wall there are blow-ups of portraits of young musicians. Not unlike the portraits you see in concert halls all around the world: black and white, tail coats, evening gowns. But here: *Mises en scène*, and *mise à mort* of non-recognized *Wunderkinder*. The expression of their faces is justly (or: kindly and tautologically) characterized later on by a theatre director in this way: *"The portraits of 'the dead' under earth remind me of something that I try to achieve as a director in my work with the actors. That expression of a face. A glance into the future, a definitive, doomed and simultaneously eternal expression. This is 'art' and not 'life'. The secret of acting."*

Later on, we have lunch with Boltanski in the Parisian spring light and he pays. He selects a Burger Vilette for himself, with Burgundy. He loves food. We have fish. You see a compressed version of the lunch talk above.

During the lunch, we address Boltanski with one single question:

"What happens to judgement today?"

And, of course – he does not reply. By no means. The reason for this being probably that Boltanski, as any good artist, is entirely *en aval*, downriver. Art comes after research, as it were.

His work – including his accompanying performative discourse – is a dialogical response to the world of crime, punishment, research and catastrophe. Memories of judgement and doom, as something personal and collective is the main *aboutness* of his art, based on things that are, above all, recognizable and empathic in their frailty, *mises en abyme*.

"I am interested in memory, not in the Proustian, autobio-

graphical way. But as the passage from the highly personal to the highly collective."

Not doing judgements, selections and evaluations and critique – but being with the judged; surviving, or dying, with the judged. Not doing research, not being busy with "discovery", not being busy at all, dealing slowly only with the recognizable and with recognition of the recognized. One idea every two years. That is being in art. Full stop.

"In a way I am very conservative. And it is also because I want to be only an artist. If you go into politics, it is so funny that you might forget to be an artist. I don't like cars. I don't like holidays. I wake up in the morning – and it is time to think about art!"

Boltanski's work is ephemeral, and he works with fragile materials, old clothes, photos of the forgotten and disappeared, unidentifiable heartbeats, leftovers and debris from everyday life. Recognizable objects to be recycled and used. His work could and should certainly not be assimilated to any "research culture": it is individuation, but not individualization.

But we live our lives, we do research and make discoveries, there is knowledge to be brought out of the interaction of practice and context, and there are research questions lurking in that very context that make us – and himself – move into the work of art, and interact with it, make it and reconstruct it.

There is certainly a zone of interaction and complexity in there that challenges our constructions of knowledge, and more. And the knowledge of what that challenge is about, and how it is made, and the materiality of that knowledge, is the artist's knowledge; and, if it is knowledge, it is a shared one.

Introduction

INGRID ELAM

Ingrid Elam is a Swedish writer and critic. She is a Professor in Literary composition and currently Dean of the Faculty of Fine, Applied and Performing Arts at the University of Gothenburg and Chair of PARSE. She holds a PhD in Comparative literature since 1985. Between 1989 and 2000 she was the cultural editor of the Swedish newspapers *iDAG*, *Göteborgs-Posten* and *Dagens Nyheter*. From 2003 to 2012 she was employed at Malmö University, where, among other positions, she acted as the Dean of the School of Art and Communication.

JOHAN ÖBERG

Johan Öberg is a critic, literary translator (Russian, French, English) and publisher (*Ord&Bild* 1989-1994, *Art Monitor* 2006-2012). He has also been working in the field of cultural diplomacy, social prevention, etc. He currently works as secretary of research at Faculty of Fine, Applied and Performing arts, and with the Critical Heritage Studies network, both at the University of Gothenburg. He was one of the organizers of the 15th International Bakhtin Conference, July 2014 in Stockholm.

HENK SLAGER

Research and visual art have been the focus of many activities developed by Henk Slager over the last ten years. As professor of artistic research he has made significant contributions to the debate on the role of research in visual art and as Dean of the Utrecht Graduate School of Visual Art and Design (MaHKU) he has contributed to the launching of productions such as the yearly Dutch Artistic Research Event (DARE) and the publication of the biannual *MaHKUzine: Journal of Artistic Research*. In 2005, Henk Slager, together with Jan Kaila and Gertrud Sandqvist, initiated the European Artistic Research Network (EARN), a network investigating the consequences of artistic research for current art education in symposia, expert meetings, and presentations. Departing from a similar focus on artistic research, he has also produced various curatorial projects, the most recent being *The Judgment is the Mirror* (Living Art Museum, Reykjavik, 2013) and *Joyful Wisdom* (Parallel Event Istanbul Biennial, 2013).

1. *Art and Research Journal: A Journal of Ideas, Contexts and Methods*. URL: <http://www.artandresearch.org.uk>

2. *Journal Of Artistic Research*. URL: <http://www.jar-online.net>

3. *ArtMonitor: The Swedish Journal for Artistic Research*. URL: <http://konst.gu.se/samverkan/publikationer/artmonitor>

4. Utrecht Graduate School of Visual Art and Design. *MaHKUzine: Journal of Artistic Research*. URL: http://www.mahku.nl/activities/publications_index.html

5. Universitatea de Arte "George Enescu" Iasi. *Vector - cercetare critica in context*. URL: http://www.arteiasi.ro/ita/publ/Vector_2014.pdf

6. The European Artistic Research Network. URL: <http://www.artresearch.eu>

7. The Society for Artistic Research. URL: <http://www.societyforartisticresearch.org>

8. Stepchange for Higher Arts Research Education Network. URL: <http://www.sharenetwork.eu>

9. The decision to employ this dual mode of production is in recognition of the different materialities and valencies of these forms, and the wish to accord contributors an opportunity to utilise the affordances of both.

WE BEGIN with a dialogue between the artist Christian Boltanski and the editors, where the danger and intrinsic slipperiness of judgement are manifest. This dialogical text is both an enactment of judgement and a deferral of judgement, as we move from Boltanski's – "the older you get, the more you want to talk about serious things, and you become pompous" – to – "there is only discrepancy and postponed judgement." The text is unsettled in its genre: part artist's statement, part interview, part anecdote, part travelogue, and part diaristic reflection. The tangle of genre is a formal strategy that serves well to disclose the knotted discursivity of contemporary art rhetorics and the often oblique thematisation of its discourses. In the playful yet provocative torsion of its form-content, this text seems a fitting preface with which to announce a new peer-review journal that seeks to encourage, extend, and enlarge the dialogue of artistic research with other knowledge practices and other disciplines, but most importantly, to do so in a manner grounded in artistic practices and protocols.

It is now well established that within the arts there are energetic research cultures already active in many different institutional contexts. Through the work of journals such as *Art and Research*¹, *The Journal of Artistic Research*², *Art Monitor*³, *MaHKUzine: Journal of Artistic Research*⁴ and *Vector*⁵ there has been a lively unfolding of both concrete examples of artistic enquiry and wider debates about the nature, rationale, and methodological bases of artistic research. The activities of many networks such as the European Artistic Research Network (EARN)⁶,

the Society for Artistic Research (SAR)⁷, and the SHARE Network⁸ have also demonstrated the existence of a lively international community of researchers with distinct agendas and priorities in the construction of a research programme. It is now timely, indeed urgent, to establish a forum for the interaction and exchange of work by artist researchers with work by colleagues operative in other disciplinary contexts so that the real contribution and challenge of artistic research may be profiled, tested and engaged by other research communities and by wider publics.

The Platform for Artistic Research Sweden (PARSE) has been established precisely to meet this challenge. It comprises a publishing and conferencing framework located in Gothenburg, Sweden, animated and guided by an international network of multidisciplinary practitioners, researchers and scholars. PARSE has projected four streams of activity that seek to achieve this overarching goal of profiling, testing, and indeed contesting the claims of artist researchers in the encounter across different disciplinary, institutional and pragmatic formations. These four lines of development through PARSE are: (i) a peer-reviewed journal; (ii) a biennial conference and presentation event; (iii) a networking of researchers around shared research concerns; and (iv) a series of special profiles of exemplary practices, case-histories or projects that seek to disclose some of the key achievements and staging-posts in the elaboration of research in and through arts practice. The first line of activity brings us to the generation of this journal as a peer-reviewed production actualised in print

and online.⁹ In all four lines of development a key ambition will be to promote dialogue with other knowledge forms and practices while maintaining an anchorage in the different practices of the arts: the arts understood as different from each other as much as they may differ from non-arts disciplinary traditions and professional domains, and recognising the fugitive nature of the boundaries proposed between art and non-art.

The basic strategy adopted by PARSE, in order to foster this dialogue, is to employ a broadly thematic approach to the gathering of different researchers around common problems, questions, uncertainties, objects, states of affairs or sites of contestation, while at the same time being mindful of the limitations of such thematic constructions – particularly in the context of artistic and philosophical enquiries which tend to problematize generic procedures and prioritise the integrity and specificity of singular works. Announcing a way of working, and problematizing that way of working in the same moment, should not be read as a simple performative contradiction or a case of academic hedging, but rather it should be seen as the reflexivity of critical research practice and an indication of the experimental and explorative agenda of the journal.

The thematic constructions that we have developed to initiate the new platform (judgement, value, repetition, time) point toward an open, inclusive dialogue, but they also indicate, by virtue of their wide focus, this dialogue's relatively youthful stage of development. In the first issue we start with questions of judgement. We do not propose judgement as an artistic research object, but rather as a condition of possibility for artistic practice and for considered enquiry: No art without judgement, no research without judgement. It is a theme that announces a condition and a problem of all our work: What is the current state of affairs? What matters? What is to be done? For the second issue, Fall 2015, we will constellate a range of research contributions around the question of "value" in the

contemporary arts, drawing upon current work by theorists, practitioners, participant-observers and academic analysts on the dynamics and behaviours of art world systems and economies. For the third issue, Winter 2015, we re-visit the thorny question of re-enactment and the re-performance of works of art, activating a wide range of discourses in order to capture where current thinking and practice is now situated in order to foreground what advances have been made with respect to this perennial problem in the ontology of the work of art.

For the first PARSE international conference, also taking place in Fall 2015, we will assemble a diverse body of researchers, artists, educators, theorists, technologists and critics around the complex question of time. This cross-disciplinary dialogue will address the question of chronopolitics in all its many diverse guises, from the temporal framing of climate change to the feeling backwards of queer culture.

In all of these instances of thematic construction, we are actively soliciting contributions from researchers and practitioners who believe that they have some new insight, or some new intervention to make with regard to the current state of the art and with reference to the general conditions of debate. The novelty we seek is not the trivial innovation of the merely modishly new, but the substantive and considered contribution of partners in a critical exchange based on shared enquiry. By this expression "shared enquiry" we do not mean to indicate consensus, but rather we include within this, the urgent contestation of judgements as to what should have wider salience for, and make claims upon, our collective attention within current artistic practice and research.

It is for this reason that we begin with this first issue on judgement. In inviting contributions under this overarching heading we indicated the persistence of a condition of ungrounded-ness: Ours is a time when all traditional forms of judgement and evaluation

are put into question, into doubt, are subverted whether this be a matter of the judgements of experts, critics, of courts, Academia, the Churches, or simply “men” and “women”. Judgement is now seen as one more symbolic construct among others. It has been torn down from its “theoretical” position, and transformed into contested practice among other contested practices. But nonetheless it is practiced. Judgement is operative within the giddy violent flows of what is variously dubbed late modernity, liquid modernity, the contemporary, the era of globalization or *mondialisation*. Indeed, one of the seemingly unending *agons* of judgement is this very attempt to pronounce, upon the nature of the current historical moment, its boundaries and its valences. In framing the problematic of judgement, the following questions which indicate the problematic construction of “the now” were presented as possible points of departure: Where and when and by whom is judgement and evaluation actually taking place today? What is the value and the legitimacy of judgements today? Where, when and by whom are judgements made about those values?

These questions are elaborated and some of the contradictions and dilemmas of judgement are unpacked in the tripartite “Opening to a Discussion on Judgement” by Simon Critchley, Mick Wilson and Andrea Phillips. This text picks up on the disjunctions already signalled in the prefacing dialogue with Boltanski, and extends these with reference to several wider arenas of judgement including sport, education and the art market. This is followed by Mine Doğantan-Dack’s reflection on “Artistic Research in Classical Music Performance: Truth and Politics” where she draws out the potential of artistic research to overhaul seemingly stable systems of judgement while also anticipating questions of re-performance that will be central to a later issue of the journal. Maria Lind makes a polemical intervention where she writes “About Urgency and Quality in Contemporary Art” demonstrating the enlivening force of judgement even as she identifies the urgent threats to its exercise in contemporary art. In lyrical

counterpoint to Lind’s contribution, Maria Fusco provides an “An Amateur’s Prolegomenon” in the form of a series of poetic meditations on judgement as it arises in the flow of experience. The question of judgement and the hermeneutic protocols of images in the courtroom are re-staged by Ruth Herz in her critical exploration of “The Naked Truth: A Pictorial View of Justice.” This brings us to the closing contribution, Rainer Ganahl’s robust defence of pedagogical judgement in “Strange Teaching: The Artist as Excellent and Miserable Teacher.” Ganahl’s text serves as a relay back to, and as a contrast with, Boltanski’s opening lines where he also refers to questions of judgement and the teaching of art: “I think I was very tolerant. I had very few students. I am not optimistic enough.”

Opening to a Discussion on Judgement

Editors' note: This text is derived from the transcript of the opening statements from Simon Critchley, Mick Wilson and Andrea Phillips at a public discussion on the theme of "Judgement" held in Gothenburg in April 2014 and marking the initiation of the Platform for Artistic Research Sweden. The format of the event was an open dialogue, during which each of the three speakers was asked to open with a short statement that would frame the issues and concerns that the question of judgement currently sets in play in the context of contemporary artistic practice, education and research. The purpose of this exchange between three members of the PARSE Journal editorial committee was to frame the theme of judgement as a point of departure for the new publication. While retaining the relatively informal mode of address of the original context of presentation, the transcript has been edited and modified for publication.

SIMON CRITCHLEY

Simon Critchley is Hans Jonas Professor at the New School for Social Research. He also teaches at the European Graduate School. His many books include *Very Little... Almost Nothing*, *Infinitely Demanding*, *The Book of Dead Philosophers*, *The Faith of the Faithless*, and, with Tom McCarthy, *The Matter of Matter: Documents from the Archive of the International Necronautical Society*. A new book on Hamlet called *Stay, Illusion!*, co-authored with Jamieson Webster, was published in 2013 by Pantheon Books in the US and Verso in the UK. An experimental new work, *Memory Theatre*, is forthcoming. Simon Critchley writes for *The Guardian* and is moderator of 'The Stone', a philosophy column in *The New York Times*, to which he is a frequent contributor.

MICK WILSON

Mick Wilson is an artist, educator and researcher; Head of the Valand Academy of Arts, University of Gothenburg (2012-); member of European Artistic Research Network (2005-); formerly chair of SHARE (2010-13); founder Dean of GradCAM, Ireland (2008-2012); and first Head of Research, NCAD, Ireland (2005-7). Edited volumes include: with Paul O'Neill, *Curating Research* (2014); and *Curating and the Educational Turn* (2010); with Schelte van Ruiten *SHARE Handbook for Artistic Research Education* (2013). Ongoing projects include "the food thing" (2011-); and "dead publics" (2009-). See <http://www.smallfatman.com>

ANDREA PHILLIPS

Andrea Phillips is Professor of Fine Art in the Department of Art, Goldsmiths, University of London, and Director of the Doctoral Research Programmes in Fine Art and Curating. She publishes widely in art and architecture journals, artist's monographs and collections on politics, philosophy and contemporary art practice, and speaks internationally on art, architecture and politics. Between 2006-2009 she was Director of Curating Architecture, a think tank based in the Art Department that investigated the aesthetic and political relationship between architecture, curating and concepts of public display, and resulted in an exhibition and publication. Andrea Phillips was the Curator of the Public Programme at the Istanbul Biennial in October 2013.

AP: Shall I begin? I am Andrea Phillips and I work at Goldsmiths in the University of London, and I am responsible for what is here in Sweden called “artistic research.” In the UK context it is normally understood as “practice-based research” which is a slight difference in language, but effectively we are talking about the same thing. I also curate, and work on developing public programmes and institutions, galleries and museums in various places in Europe and internationally.

MW: I am Mick Wilson and I am the Head of the Valand Academy of Arts here in Gothenburg. An artist by training, I would primarily identify myself as a teacher, but I also engage in research and in writing criticism.

SC: I am Simon Critchley, and I am Chief Philosopher of the International Necronautical Society, and a supporter of Liverpool Football Club.

AP: What’s a *Chief* Philosopher?

SC: Well, there is only *one*. We’ve got a General Secretary, a Head of Propaganda, a Chief Philosopher...

AP: Marvellous!

SC: ... and an Environmental Engineer.

AP: All you need.

MW: So we begin with this very general question of judgement...

AP: I think it’s quite important to say that the first issue of PARSE is on the theme of judgement. So one of the things we’re trying to think through is the way in which judgement refracts within the field of contemporary art, curating and research. That’s the context for our talk here today, but as befits the way in which we’re approaching PARSE, we’re not really concerned with spending a lot of time investigating what artistic research *is*. We feel that

that question has been mulled over, perhaps for too long already within the Anglo-European context. The dialogues on artistic research that we wish to promote are those that may have broad significance for everybody working within the contemporary political and social context. Therefore *judgement* seemed to us to be a very important nexus of what we might call “missing thought”: We don’t think enough about judgement. So it seemed to us an interesting point of departure rather than a question about the definition of artistic research as such.

MW: ... and I see that Simon has some notes prepared, so maybe, Simon, you would be willing to kick things off then?

SC: Well, ok then, I have some remarks here. The first is that I don’t know how to judge art works: I don’t know how to make aesthetic judgements, and when I see a work, I don’t know what to say: *Do I like it? Is it good?* – I don’t know. I’m consumed by anxiety at that moment. You’re looking at something in a museum... What’s it called? Who’s the artist? You look for help. So the whole experience of judgement for me induces a kind of massive anxiety, and you wait for other people to say something: *What do you think? Do you like it?* Then you might say something like: *“Oh it’s interesting.”* The word “interesting” is used a lot in relationship to contemporary art. I was with an artist last week and the word that he kept using to describe his work was “complicated”: *“It’s complicated.” “It’s interesting.”* What on earth do those things mean? We don’t have a vocabulary of judgement. We don’t really know how to judge, and so we say things like “interesting.” And we hope that people won’t think that we’re fools. So my problem with judgement is – and this is my second remark then – none of us really know what to think ... *“Did you see that?” “Yeah I hated it” – or “I liked it.” “Oh you liked it?” “I hated it.” “Yeah, but maybe you’re right, maybe I liked it too.”* It’s like Facebook. You like it. You don’t like it. So judgement becomes reduced to this... this anxiety inducing banality: You don’t know what to think.

Now, I wish that art were more like sports, particularly more like football, because, when it comes to football, questions of judgement are much more precise. I could say a number of things – I won't do this in this context – about Liverpool Football Club. Their merits. Their demerits. Their complications.

I could provide complicated reasoning to justify a position, and, if you knew about that too, you could provide complicated counter-reasoning, and we could watch a game together, and we could discuss it, and judge things at every moment, and we'd be relaxed, we'd be enjoying ourselves, and we know what to think, and we'd be happy to make judgements, and we'd be happy for there to be counter-judgements against the judgements we make, and that's the way it is. Recently I've gone back to looking at Brecht for other reasons, and Brecht, in his early writings, is thinking about the kind of audience that he would have liked for his work, and he said that the kind of audience he'd like would be like a sports crowd. And he wanted people to smoke cigars and drink during theatre performances, because they'd be more relaxed, because the idea is that, basically, the real thing about judgement is that people are either consumed by anxiety, and then they go into a theatre and they kind of switch off – nothing happens, they go to sleep – so how do you keep an audience awake and informed and intelligent? Well, a sports crowd does that all the time, and so it becomes a kind of paradigm for judgement for me, relaxed judgement... so I wish audiences in galleries were more like audiences at football matches. It would be a lot more fun.

Now, the peculiar thing about aesthetic judgements is that the form of aesthetic judgements is one where we want some kind of agreement, so when I say: I like it, or this is beautiful, the form of that judgement is one where we're trying to get assent or agreement from somebody else. It somehow isn't enough when it comes to aesthetic judgement to say: "*This is fine for me. I like this.*" We want in the form of judgement some kind of agreement or assent,

which is to say that aesthetic judgements have the peculiar character of being trans-subjective, they're expressions of taste or of distaste, but they have an intersubjective form, they make an appeal to others... They are judgements that I say in the hope of finding agreement, or in the hope that you don't think I'm an asshole, or that I've got no taste.

So there's something about the form of judgement that doesn't appeal to others... trans-subjective... and that's even true, it's most true negatively, so someone says something outrageous, you know, they go and see this show here, and they say to you: "*Yes, I'm the artist,*" and they say, "*It was shit, you should be ashamed of yourself.*" That expression of negative judgement is also a confirmation of agreement. By saying an outrageous statement, you're inverting the kind of agreement that is necessary to the form of aesthetic judgement, and that's a peculiar thing. Then we face this old classical problem, which I want to just raise, I don't really have a solution to it, but... judgement, aesthetic judgements, are trans-subjective, they're more than... they're more than me. They seem to have some form that requires assent, and that's what usually leads to the claim that aesthetic judgements require universality.

That's the argument basically in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, more or less, very, very simply. Judgements concerning the beautiful have within them something that can cause a universal voice, so then we end up in this conflict between universality of judgement and particularity of judgement. We seem to expect that judgements should have a universal form, and if they're not universal that means that anything goes and we're in some situation of relativism. That is where things play up, and that's kind of uninteresting, I think. Aesthetic judgements have a trans-subjective form *and* they are contextual, they are contextual judgements. I think we can give up on the problem of relativism, and just accept that judgements are judgements which I make in a certain context, which I want other people to agree with, but which I don't expect

everybody to agree with. There is no need at that point to immediately go to the question of universality. I am talking about this on a very basic level, not complicated judgements. I am talking about this in relationship to things like... going to see a movie and that moment when you see a movie together with someone, perhaps someone that you know well, and you leave the cinema, and you're with a crowd of people, and it's dark, and you're not sure what the other person thought about the film. There's that moment where you say: "*Did you like it?*" You put it in the form of a question: "*Did you like it?*" or, "*I thought that was great,*" and they say: "*I thought that was shit,*" and then you respond... "*Oh really?*" ... There is something again in those expressions of aesthetic taste. For example, at the moment I've recently rediscovered, in the last two weeks, the genius of Scott Walker, of the Walker Brothers, and this extraordinary career of, sort of, avant-garde music. I discovered this. I've written a book on David Bowie, which is coming out soon, and Scott Walker was a huge influence on Bowie. Now, I want people to like Scott Walker, you know, because it's just amazing. Every chance I get I'm playing Scott Walker tracks to people saying "*Just listen to this.*" (*Laughter*) It's extraordinary, and they say, "*Yeah, I suppose it's ok,*" or "*Maybe that works for you, maybe it's a boy thing*": My wife said that. I played *Farmer in the City*, which is about Pasolini: "*Oh maybe it's a boy thing.*" (*Laughter*) I'm crushed at that point, so my judgement at that point is a judgement about the genius of Scott Walker. It isn't enough for me, just to play those tracks on Youtube in my hotel room, which I did this morning, I want those judgements to be... general.

That's an opening remark then, that's actually five, six, no, four remarks and the others can be really quick. I'm teaching Hölderlin next week. I won't go through this, but Hölderlin, the great poet, for some of us, *the* poet, who has this fragment from 1795 called *Urteil und Sein* (Judgement and Being). It's an incredibly enigmatic fragment. It's a page, in German, and Hölderlin says in respect

of Judgement, *Urteil*, that it links back to the idea of separation, of *Teilung*. *Urteil*, judgement becomes primary separation, separation from what, separation from Being, *Sein*. So the thought in Hölderlin is that there is Being, by which Hölderlin means everything, the world, the whole, and in judgement we separate ourselves from the whole. The judgement that Hölderlin is thinking about is the judgement: I am I, I am I... He kind of leaves it at that, because he was Hölderlin and he was a bit crazy... and he can do things like that. But the thought there seems to be that in judgement I say: I am I, or I am Simon, but in saying I am Simon, I'm separating myself both from the world of objects. I am not chairs, I am not buildings, I am me, and I am separating myself from myself. So in saying: I am I, I am not, as it were, presenting myself, I'm presenting myself in a separate or divided form.

So there's something very peculiar about the form of judgement, it is separation from the world... "*I am Simon*" and, in saying that, it is a separation from myself. To give another example, a kind of local example, there's the amazing moment, it's the 450th anniversary of Shakespeare, which, well there we are... Well, he had a way with words didn't he, Shakespeare? And there's the extraordinary moment in Hamlet, where in Act 5 Scene 1, there is the funeral of Ophelia, and Laertes jumps in the grave, because Laertes is very frustrated with the lack of ceremony surrounding the suicide of his sister. Hamlet sees this and loses it at that moment, and runs towards the grave and he says: "*It is I, Hamlet the Dane.*" It is the only time in the play that Hamlet names Hamlet. He names himself in the third person. It is a judgement. It is a judgement made in relationship to another, Laertes, a kind of a double with whom he is comparing himself, and separating himself from... The assertion: "*It is I, Hamlet the Dane,*" is not the articulation of some kind of unified subject. It is a separation of the subject from itself. So judgements also have that form, it is very peculiar... and that is Hölderlin's thought.

The other things that I was going to say, two more things... I had this remark about Nietzsche, but that can wait. Going back to Kant... now, in Kant's critique of aesthetic judgement there are two categories of judgement: judgements of the beautiful and judgements of the sublime. Judgements of the beautiful, where I say: "*This is beautiful*," are expressions where, Kant says, there is a kind of free play of the imagination and the understanding. The way I understand that, is that the beautiful is a kind of harmony. Kant is not thinking about art works, he is thinking about our experience. For example, if you could imagine driving a Volvo... No, you drove a Volvo... Imagine driving a very expensive Mercedes through the California desert, and your car is working perfectly, and you've got the music, you've got Scott Walker... (*Laughter*) ... on the music, and there's no traffic on the roads, and everything is in a kind of harmony, beautifully. That's the beautiful for Kant. Judgements of the beautiful have that form. Judgements of the sublime are refractory to the beautiful. They are almost too much, Kant says, but not too much. We can still articulate them in relationship to something vast, like a raging sea, or... St. Peter's in Rome is an example that he gives. Or, because Kant was Kant, the experience of the moral law... the moral law for Kant is the experience of the sublime. He was a bit strange that way.

What is important in this notion of the sublime is that the sublime is almost too much, it is a judgement that is almost too much, but it's not too much. There has to be a limit, for Kant, between judgements of the sublime, which are almost too much, and judgements of the monstrous, the *Ungeheuer*, which are too much. Judgements of the monstrous do not have any place in the aesthetic realm. That is the distinction I want to draw attention to: Judgements of the sublime are almost too much, and judgements of the monstrous, which are absolutely too much, and which pull us outside of the aesthetic realm. They induce in us cancers and experiences of disgust: the word in German is *Ekel*. It's a very interesting word, it's all over Nietzsche,

it's all over Heine Müller. *Hamlet Maschine* is all about *Ekel, Ekel, Ekel*. I mention the monstrous here because it seems that what has happened in different areas of art over the last century, in different media, in theatre, in visual art, have been articulations of the monstrous. It is the way we could think about Bacon's painting, it's the way we can think about the blood orgies of Hermann Nitsch or Artaud's theatre of cruelty or the theatre of Sarah Kane, or whatever. We've got innumerable examples. What is interesting about experiences of monstrosity like these, that produce disgust in us, is that they raise the question of judgement, which pushes at the border between art and non-art. When we're looking at something and it disgusts us, we often ask the question: "*Well, is it art? Is it?*" Or we are disgusted by it – "*It's just a fucking empty bed*," Tracey Emin, "*That's not art, it's an empty... unmade bed with a bunch of crap in it*." Art is often about those explorations of the limits between art and anti-art, which turn on this question of monstrosity, which is also a perplexity about judgement. It seems to me that what is going on, or what has gone on, in relation to judgement in a whole number of areas can be seen to turn around this question of the porosity of the border between art and non-art. So whatever art is, we are uncertain what art is, and we're uncertain what art is in relationship to different forms of non-art, and that takes on different articulations. This could be non-art in terms of economic value, in terms of "*Well this isn't art, it's just reducible to its financial form*"; it can be the frontier between art and fashion, "*This isn't art, it's fashion*"; "*This is not art, it's pop music*"; or "*This isn't art, it's advertising*". The whole debate around Warhol and pop art, and the way this has been articulated for us in recent years, picks up on something much older and much deeper: this is the relationship between art and non-art, and judgements concerned with that in relationship to politics.

Let me give you a concrete example to explain what I mean. After Zuccotti Park, after Occupy Wall Street happened, a friend of mine called Colin,

who's also a Liverpool fan, published a book three weeks afterwards, a print on demand book, a very fast book, of interviews, of documents from people that were in the protest, and it began with a two-dimensional plan, a two-dimensional overview of Zuccotti Park. Zuccotti Park was represented as a kind of rectangle in a two-dimensional overview, a floor plan, and you have the assembly area, the library, the kitchen, the media centre, the sleeping area, the drum-beating area, whatever, it's all laid out in the plan. Looking at that two-dimensional plan, I thought: *"Fuck, it was an installation; of course it was an installation, it always was an installation, and not just any installation, it's a Thomas Hirschhorn installation."* Zuccotti Park was a Thomas Hirschhorn installation. Thomas Hirschhorn was in town around that time because he was planning to do his Gramsci Monument in the Bronx, the fourth in his series of monuments. Spinoza, Deleuze, Bataille and Gramsci... So I said to Thomas: "Isn't it funny that Zuccotti Park looked like one of your installations?" and he said, *"Yes, yes... It looked like one of my installations, but what I'm doing is art and not politics."* This is interesting, in that moment, there's a judgement, and so what you have is that porosity between art and non-art, which takes on different articulations: one articulation of that is the art of politics, demurring, and, at which point some of us would say *"No, it's not art, it's politics"*; or *"It's not politics, it's art."* This is something which is structural for us. Whatever art is, it becomes something which is not just what the artist says it is: This is not Duchamp's moment, it's the kind of moment where art practice is, as it were, systematically resembling something which isn't art. Last week I was in Chicago inside this thing by a Chicago based artist John Preus, a work called *The Beast*. There was a huge dead bull or a dying bull – Chicago Bulls, big bull's head, meat, slaughter houses, Upton Sinclair. We were all inside this bull having a discussion, about 20 people, and John Preus just wants it to be a space where people can hang out. A lot of artists like that, we call it... what... "social practice." He wants a kind of community

centre, but it's inside an art work, and that is one, as it were, symptom of this that then raises the question of judgement again in a really peculiar way, and that's about it...

AP: Was it a real bull?

SC: No, it was a bull made out of... it's interesting, he's an artist who, to make money, made furniture and developed incredibly good carpentry skills... It's a wooden structure which is covered with carpets which were discarded... Everything that it's made from was thrown away from buildings in the area so it is all this sustainable, reused material, all very good.

We were inside this structure and it was furnished with school desks that were from public schools that were closed the previous year in Chicago, so it's about things that are dead or considered useless and which are being re-used, in order to create a space where people can hang out. That's only one example, there are thousands like that across the world where what's going on in art is something that is pushing on that frontier between art and non-art, and where that question of judgement I think, for us, gets really complicated. *What is this? What does it mean?* and then, *What do we say in relationship to it?* If I sit there for a couple of hours and say: *I like it; It's beautiful, That's interesting; It's complicated.* What do I say? Maybe say nothing, I don't know.

MW: Where to pick up from here...? The word "judgement", in English at least, indicates both the capacity, the power of judgement, but it also indicates the event of the judgement, and this event entails both the content and the consequence of judgement. So there is the power, and there is the event of judgement. The event of judgement can be seen as punctal, it happens at a point, the decisive moment when judgement is pronounced. However, there is also this kind of durational aspect of judgement, there is an ongoing power to give judgement, and in the notion of the punctal

judgement there is the possibility that a number of possible different futures exist, a number of possible scenarios, a number of contingencies are there, and then an act of judgement is made, and there is some closing down of the futures, some path is selected and a judgement may be seen to determine this path.

This can be a matter of the judgement of the court of law, but it can also be in the judgement made within an art world context: *“Is this thing before me, is it art or not?”* It is in the power of some that their judgement that *“This is not art”* determines that this does not command further discussion. In each case the judgement in some way determines that some futures are closed down and another pathway is opened out. Therefore these aspects of judgement, both the punctal judgement, which delivers a consequence, but also the more general durational process of judgement, and the capacity to produce it so as to effect consequences, these are things that arise in the normal business of teaching artists. However, it is interesting how it happens within the process of teaching artists because, on the one hand, the student artist will be in a situation of maybe waiting upon the judgement of either their peers, or the teacher, or the visiting artist or whomever is going to make a pronouncement on their work: *“Is what I’m doing interesting? Is it important? Does this look like art to you?”* and so there is a certain sense of waiting upon that punctal event of judgement. *“She said she liked my work.”* In some sense we teachers are supposed to be communicating a capacity, or elaborating or encouraging the capacity of judgement. So students regularly show up to art school with their passion for... I mean it was Salvador Dali a few generations ago, and now I guess it’s probably Damien Hirst or something like that, or maybe Tracey Emin...

AP: Thomas Hirshhorn?

MW: It is simply that the student artist arrives with a particular set of judgements already made and a particular set of art interests. They show up with

this certain set of passions and investments, and, typically, regardless of what that investment is, one of the tasks of education is to somehow disenchant them, it is to somehow problematise it. Therefore the student is placed in a situation of anticipating or receiving a judgement from the “Master-who-knows.” This applies also in the situation where the student wishes to hear this judgement if only so they can say that the one who presumes him- or herself to be master is wrong, and is mistaken in their claim to authoritative judgement etc. (*Laughter*) In some way the student is still dependent upon a judgement to come from elsewhere (if only the judgement to admit them to the institution of art education). At the same time, the idea seems to be that the teacher has the task of cultivating judgement in the student.

What makes this particularly problematic is that we operate in the wake of a whole series of avantgardes and aesthetic revolutions and so forth. We recognise that the institutions of art education were not the site where these earlier breakthroughs happened, that in some way the institutions were characterised precisely by their initial rejections of these developments. (In music education we speak of Conservatories, and this is an appropriate term for much of what passes for art education.) The avantgarde was the avantgarde because the institutions, the academies, rejected these developments. So now we have this kind of institution where we know (or believe we know) that, historically, the academy, teachers made the mistake of disavowing the new, of rejecting what would subsequently be valorised as the cultural achievements of the age, and we have this anticipation that we cannot disavow the new based on some inherited frame of value or criteria. This is especially the case when, in some way, the task of the student is apparently to overthrow the inherited regimes of taste and judgement, and so forth. Therefore in the art teaching process we are in this really problematic situation of being, on the one hand, afraid to make judgement and on the other hand, trying to encourage judgement. Often this means that we dump the problem all back onto

the student: “What do you think? What do you find interesting? What do you decide in favour of?”

This situation is not just the question of what one feels or thinks or enjoys or finds relevant or meaningful, it is about when the encounter with an art work passes over into a particular moment of communication about that encounter, when one pronounces upon it. You go see a movie with a friend, and in the aftermath of viewing there is somehow an expectation, or even a need, to pass comment on the movie. This is often a moment of expectation where something has to be said. The experience has to pass over into language and there is something about this passing over into language that is anxious and unsettling. In some contexts, like the game of football that Simon describes, or in many other contexts, this passing over into language of our judgement is not one that is freighted with the same kind of anxiety: It just happens in the flow of social exchange, and it may be even that we can find great joy in the pronouncement and even great fun in the gaming with another person that has counter-judgements and so forth...

SC: Yeah, absolutely.

MW: ... but when it comes to the moment of art we have this question of, well, what's the consequence of me making this judgement? And I would suggest that part of the issue is that you can make the judgement on the Liverpool team for example because it can be done as if it's important... but really it is without strong consequences, and so we can play that game with a certain ease. In the case of art, it's probably largely without strong consequence, but there is this apprehension that perhaps there *should* be consequence here. This is supposed to be a space of significance and importance and there *should* be consequence. In some sense the hesitancy of judgement in respect of the art work might be that we anticipate that there should be something of consequence here, something should proceed from this, and one of our concerns perhaps is recognis-

ing that, in the gaming around judgements in sport, again the case of Liverpool, there's a certain game of the production of the self. However, in respect of this gaming around the production of taste judgements (as we know from Bourdieu and so forth) one of the things that we are marking with a distinction when we pronounce upon the work of art, or when we make these pronouncements of taste, is ourselves, we are producing an idea of ourselves. The distinction that we are making is not really about: *is this good or bad?*, or what's out there, but what kind of person am I and where do I sit within the social order. I would not wish to reduce the questions of taste and judgement to only that action of social reproduction, but I do want to acknowledge that it is a substantial moment in what's going on in the occasion of judgement. Perhaps, this is a significant part of the apprehension experienced in making judgement. Even this question of the judgement of “interest” which while commonplace is still something that we can find as a cause for anxiety that makes us slow to judge: *“O, you really think that's interesting and complicated?”* On the other hand, there are many other kinds of judgements that we do make as we shift around the art work, perhaps *avoiding* commitment on: *Is this a good piece of work or not? Is this important? Is this compelling?* We might still make assertions on seemingly simpler questions like (I'm citing Danto here) “daintiness”, or “prettiness” or “funkiness”, or “cool-ness”. So there are pronouncements that we are making that are amenable to the same analytic as the judgement of beauty or the judgement of the sublime, they fit within it in some way.

AP: ... and then become inconsequential?

MW: They are pedestrian as well... to see something as dainty or not dainty, that discernment is not necessarily something that's freighted with the same significance and burden of subject formation as happens with the pronouncement on the beautiful. These are things that have a different history to them. I think that there are a lot of aesthetic

judgements being produced within the contemporary art field, they're just not the discursive site that's charged with great significance. Returning then to this question of where judgement is being prioritised: perhaps this has shifted up to the judgement of *"Is it art or not?"* Perhaps that's the primary judgement theme we work with now.

In finishing then, I don't really know how to tie these fragmentary thoughts together. I would suggest that there is something in the punctal aspect of judgement that might respond to the issues I have listed here: the fact of making judgements that we do not attend to, that we do not give significance to (*"This is pretty," "This is neat"*); the anxiety of making judgements that we see as being in a higher register – *"Is this art?" "Is this good art?" "Is this important art?"*; and the way in which this anxiety of judgement is institutionalised, in one example, in art education. In the current climate of our culture, the kind of moment that we're in, and I use education as one site that acts as an index of this anxiety about the decision, the decisive judgement. I'm interested in the possibility that what we have lost within the present moment is an investment in the idea of the punctal judgement, the decision, the ability to act and say *"These futures we close, this pathway we open up, and we cannot go back from here."* This is the judgement we make now. It's a moment of decision, and, while the judgement may be reviewed later and even re-decided, we cannot go back from this moment of judgement. Consequences proceed from this: We are making the decision. We are making the choice.

Indeed, I would go further and say that there is an aspect of judgement which I think we have lost, which is even more severe than this idea of the decision, and it's the idea of preaching. I wonder about the way in which, within an earlier moment of modernity, preaching was a central form of public judgement-making, and a judgement-making which was often self-instituting rather than the judgement of the court. The preacher steps up and, while the

preacher may draw upon the establishment of the church, there's also the preacher who steps forth on the street corner, the preacher who announces herself and begins to produce not just one judgement but a flurry of judgements, a flood of judgement and demand. I wonder about the way in which the only modern image of the judgement practices of preachers that we have is really the disturbing and unattractive kind connected to North American evangelical Christianity. This evangelical model of preaching is rightly seen as the authoritarian culture of the right and so forth. However, I'm wondering what are the possibilities of preaching that might come from an (almost) over-production of judgement, as a counterpoint to a moment in our culture when we are afraid to produce judgement, when we see the wish to externalise judgement in systems, in matrices, in audits, in some form of system that will make the judgements but relieve us of the burden of judging.

I was doing a class with some students the other day where I presented this teacher's dilemma as a thought experiment for the group: *"You have a student, you have just marked them, they fail, you learn from the counsellor that if you pass them they will get their scholarship, but if you fail them, that's it, they won't get their scholarship; what do you do?"* The class group's response was – overwhelmingly – that they would try to find a way not to have to make that choice. One should try to find a way not to make the choice because one doesn't want to do that. In effect each student was saying *"I don't want to do the right thing. I don't want to do the wrong thing. I don't want to take a decisive action. I want not to have to make a choice."* I think as a corrective to this, we might create a situation where there is a demand for an overproduction of judgement and a sense of consequence to those judgements. Not that we become pretenders of consequence, but rather to go back to this question – *"Is it art or not art?"* – and to give consequence to this. Is there some consequence to proceed from: *"Yes, this is art, this is what matters, attend to this, this counts"*; and I think this is really a

problem. I point to it in education, but I see it as a problem about our own willingness to step forward and say: *“Some choices we reject, and some choices we make, and we proceed, some futures close for us, and some pathways open.”* I think that as just one last item on this, there’s a particular fear of judgement which is identified as authoritarian, the preacher’s judgement is especially wrong: To be preaching is bad, to be judgemental is bad. This presents as a fear of the imposition of an extrinsic authority but it is actually the fear of taking power and experiencing the consequences of power, the fear of responsibility. I see this... rather than the forms of the political in art, this question of art and activism and so forth which I see as a distraction... as a more fundamental question: Accepting that one has power and taking the responsibility of using power.

AP: I agree.

SC: Good.

AP: So I’ll try and follow through with some of that, because I want to talk about judgement, value and money. I think this is directly related to these questions that you both brought up. For me, it’s not a preacher, but it’s a politician, but I think we’re describing the same subject, or subject position.

I think that what we’ve done is we have allowed judgement to be taken away from us, within the field of art, contemporary art, we’ve allowed judgement to be taken by others. However, we can’t point to that other, so we can’t say it’s Nick Serota or it’s Daniel Birnbaum, or it’s the funding council, or it’s the rector, or the dean, because we produced a system which is very much related, I think, to your analysis, whereby there isn’t the capacity to understand that moment of judgement, or enact it, or take responsibility for the person, the being of it, in a sense. I recently saw an exhibition at the House of World Culture, HKW, in Berlin, *Forensis*. It’s a very complex exhibition, comprising architectural and spatial evidence of human rights atrocities as

documented and annotated by activists, architects and planners in various parts of the world. The exhibition is a very broad overview. It is both immense and very dense. Afterwards I had a kind of violent argument about the pros and cons of this exhibition with a friend. The friend was profoundly supportive of the exhibition, and I was profoundly against it, not because of the content: We both agreed that the content was superimportant, but our argument was about whether the material should be produced in an exhibition format.

My friend’s argument was that the profundity of the visual imagery, and the re-purposing of this in the form of political information, was incredibly well rendered. My argument was that this material is wasted in an installation at HKW. It should be in a newspaper. It should be somewhere else, but it shouldn’t be here.

We had a long debate... our blood was boiling... and then we both kind of shrugged, and we looked at each other as if to say: *“My God, what have we just done?”* It was as if somebody had clicked their fingers and we became our normal conciliatory selves again and so we started to say... *“Well, of course you’re absolutely right,” “No, no, you’re right,” “No, I can see what you mean...”* We moved from this fantasy of the football terrace, or the boxing ring, the moment in which Brecht makes us argue, because he presents two positions to us, and he says: *“You need to decide, You’re in the audience, You’ve got your cigar, You’ve got your beer, and you need to decide” “Is Simon right? Or am I right?”* If you don’t walk out of his theatre having made a decision, then Brecht has failed in his job as a playwright, preacher, politician. I think we are, as Mick says, in a moment where we have allowed other people to take over the judgement of our work. This is what happens when we are in this situation you’ve described, where our instinct is to fail the student because the work doesn’t fulfil the criteria, which we have spent endless time writing. We can tick off the criteria, and say, well, yeah, it’s aesthetic criteria, 20 per cent... ability to make a

kind of contribution to knowledge, mmm...10 per cent... you know whatever the kind of ridiculous sets of criteria ...

SC: Originality

AP: Originality... So I think that we have invented systems and structures that allow us not to have to take these decisions. There's a reason for that, and I would call the reason the history of liberalism. I would say that the Kantian moment is the beginning of the development of liberal taste. It is the process of liberalism as a political formation that has allowed us to renege on our responsibility to make judgements, or – to push it slightly further – that has produced the conditions through which it is almost impossible for us to be *directly* judgemental about art.

Liberalism is a financial construction (a political methodology based on property as the basis of civility). An individual called the artist emerged, from just before and throughout liberalism. That is an artist rather than an artisan with a specific set of craft skills. This new figure – individual, autonomous – was a new assemblage of judgement, value and finance. This is where the indirect experiential transaction around art you've both described emerged.

The experiential transaction has moved from one logical transaction to another. The first is, to be crass: *"I think this is worth this much money and this is how much I'm going to pay for it"*, and we might haggle: *"OK you're quite good at woodcarving, but you're not quite as good as that guy over there so I'll pay you this much if you make my fireplace."* The experiential transaction is no longer that: We would now never ever have that kind of transactional conversation with an artist. The transactional conversation is the site where judgement becomes porous, illusory, opaque, or removed. We would never, ever, unless we were *very* unsophisticated: my children would do this but of course I wouldn't. (*Laughter*) We'd

never say: "How much is that painting?" (*Laughter*) We would never say that because it would break a whole series of social codes, bourgeois codes etc.; we wouldn't do it because it would presuppose the idea of value attached to judgement equalling price. We cannot base any of our criteria on that, which is why we use terms such as "complex" and "interesting" in the way that Simon has laid out so well for us.

"Complex" doesn't equal price, we don't say, *"Well, it's more complex, that Hirschhorn is more complex than Emin, so we'll pay more for Hirschhorn than Emin, because clearly it took Hirschhorn longer to wrap up that thing in duct tape than it took Emin to get somebody to bring that bed into the gallery."* We don't have that kind of conversation (and you know Hirschhorn doesn't do as well on the art market as Emin does). We have this experiential transaction which has taken a different form, which is a non-monetised form. Or at least it seems to be a non-monetised form. But it's actually profoundly monetised. Contemporary art is the avoidance of judgement on the basis of a new form of experiential transaction and this is due to a particular mythos, the myth that the artwork is priceless, the concept of the transactional experience is based on the pricelessness of art.

Art is priceless, which is why we can't give it direct value, we can't give it price quite literally because it's price-less. So if art is priceless, then that concept of pricelessness underscores every value that the whole structure, the whole edifice of artistic production, is based upon, from education through to what is circulated, what is displayed in galleries and museums, from the small artists' run space through to the Moderna Museet, the Tate and MoMA... They are all premised on the concept of art's pricelessness, and pricelessness is a direct challenge to the concept of judgement, because pricelessness is saying judgement is impossible. We can't put a value on Hirschhorn because Hirschhorn's work is not just about the stuff, it's not just about how much the duct tape costs and how long he spends in the Bilmer talking to the locals and wrapping them in

duct tape... We can't put a price on that because it's not just about that, it's about the conversations he has, and the fact that he brings philosophers in to talk, which is profoundly important in some way. It's also about the fact that he's placed this work in this particular situation which has this kind of political patina to it which seems to be important. All these things mean that we can't put a price on the work, and that we value it in different ways. So pricelessness is the fact of contemporary art that moves not only from art school to gallery, but importantly also, it is the conversation that happens in the auction house and in the dealer's back room. So you never ever, if you're trying to buy a work of art, you never ever go into a gallery and say: "I like that one, how much is that?"... (*Laughter*) ... Gagosian or... Barbara Weiss or... I don't know what commercial galleries you have here in Gothenburg ... but you never do that.

First of all you never even begin to have the conversation about money, unless there is an acknowledgment between you and the dealer that you are part

of a circuit of experiential transaction that understands the value of pricelessness in contemporary art. If you are a part of that transactional, experiential, non-judgemental value creation mechanism (i.e., if you're quite rich and you've already bought some stuff) then you will be invited into the back room of the dealer. Then you will begin to talk about how much you love that work, by Hirschhorn or whoever... Schiele, whoever it is... At that point, and of course you have to be incredibly much part of the conversation, if you even get to have the conversation about a Schiele work, because they are rare and they are even more priceless... at that moment, the deferral of judgement continues and it continues in this relationship between the person who wants to look after the work in perpetuity, not *buy* the work, and the dealer who recognises in the person that wants to do it that there are a set of values and a set of properties resplendent within the subject, who is the buyer, that will be able to look after, in perpetuity, this wonderful priceless piece of work; and then my people talk to your people about money, but that is not done at any point here; there

is not a cheque written at that point; so this is the way in which money is transacted in the conditions of lack of judgement and pricelessness that are the conditions of value within the contemporary art field. These are not simply important for people who want to buy work, or for art fairs, for the directors of art fairs, for those artists that are represented by galleries that get 50 per cent of the unnamed sum, but, these are very important for art educators and their students. Those of us who teach in art schools are all part of the creation of that pricelessness every time we cannot say: *“Actually, if you hadn’t used blue in that painting, then it would be good, but because you used blue in the painting, it’s bad”*, or whatever, because of course as soon as you try to say it, it sounds banal and stupid.

I won’t take much longer. However, to round up this question and come back to this concept of liberalism – this idea of pricelessness I’ve described is our inability to judge art’s value in merely transactional terms that are not experientially transactional but are financially transactional. This is not foun-

dationless, as many myths would seem to propose. It has not been like this forever, as I described very summarily earlier on: There was a time before the development of this “artist/art work condition” that is pricelessness, when the transaction was much more direct. It was, if you will, Brechtian. It was: *“Do you want it, or do you not want it? I can make it bigger, I can make it smaller.”* I have heard of situations where naïve people have walked into galleries and said: “I like that one, but I prefer it in blue” ... and they have been removed, gently and subtly, from the conversation.

SC: It’s not going to fit over the fireplace...

AP: It’s not going to fit over the fireplace, yes... So it is not foundationless, it is historically contingent on the development of a value system that is called liberalism. The importance of liberalism in this debate arises from the conditions of property ownership that developed in Europe and then became exported through colonialism to many other parts of the world, including the United States:

the key idea is the importance of property as the basis of the Bourgeois subject under liberalism. The appearance of this idea of property being not simply something you own but something that profoundly conditions your subjectivity, is also the moment at which this idea of pricelessness in art emerges.

There is a very interesting correlation between these historical developments. (Here I must also mention the fantastic work of a PhD student of mine, Nick Ferguson, he and I have talked for four years about this concept of property under liberalism. Conversations with Nick have really informed my thinking about these things.) In other words, art was not always priceless, but has become priceless through a shift in the values ascribed to it by liberalism. There have been other times when there were not these conditions of pricelessness. So if there were other times when there were not these conditions of pricelessness, working in the manner of the preacher or the politician, what would it mean to bring back the idea of price into our conversations about art? What edifices would crumble? What ways would we have to re-think the value structures of our world? And

in what ways would that expose the very conditions upon which the structures of our value system are made by, are shaped by, the financial situation that we are not able to name because of this condition of pricelessness? This is the contribution to the question of judgement that I wish to make. I have indicated that education, galleries and museums are very much part of this, however what this does, in a way, is to hide what pricelessness does, what lack of judgement does within the contemporary art sphere. It stops us being allowed to have a conversation about the conditions of the art market that that actually shapes and forms everything we do. There is this circuit of opacity that is engaged with every time we cannot have a conversation about... every time we cannot have a stand-up argument about a judgement regarding an art work.

Artistic Research in Classical Music Performance: Truth and Politics

MINE DOĞANTAN-DACK

Mine Doğan-tan-Dack is a leading figure in a new generation of artists who are also academic researchers. Mine was born in Istanbul and after receiving a BA in Philosophy from Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, she studied piano performance at the Juilliard School of Music in New York with Oxana Yablonskaya and was awarded the Scholarship of the Turkish Ministry of Education for Young Artists. While at Juilliard she won the prestigious William Petschek award. After receiving a BM and MM from the Juilliard School, she continued her studies in musicology first at Princeton University (MA), New Jersey and later at Columbia University, New York. She received an MA, MPhil and PhD in Music Theory from Columbia University, studying with Fred Lerdahl. Mine performs as a soloist and chamber musician, and has given concerts in USA, UK,

Germany, France and Turkey. She participated in the Mozart Bicentennial Festival in New York, and recorded the music of JS Bach and Scriabin for WNCN. She also recorded various programs for the Turkish radio and television. Mine is the founder of the Marmara Piano Trio and received an award from the Arts and Humanities Research Council for her work on chamber music performance. Her books include *Mathis Lussy: A Pioneer in Studies of Expressive Performance* (2002), and the edited volumes *Recorded Music: Philosophical and Critical Reflections* (2002, Middlesex University Press), and *Artistic Practice as Research in Music* (forthcoming May 2015, Ashgate). Mine was awarded Professorship in 2008 by the Turkish Ministry of Education.

THE MOST RECENT socio-economic wave of neoliberalism that has swept across the globe around the turn of the twenty-first century has been changing the nature and role of higher education, particularly in Europe, in profound ways. Representing for some a ‘neo-capitalist assault’¹ and ‘an aggressive programme’² of reforms, neoliberal policies have been associated with the increasing influence and representation of business interests, and the adoption of corporate practices within universities. In a climate where higher education institutions are expected to become more and more involved with and conform to national – and international – economic, social and political goals, their financial as well as academic autonomy has been under threat; and the independence of their most fundamental pursuit – the independence of academic research – from economic and political interests is considered by many to be increasingly imperilled.³ As market values continue to encroach upon higher education institutions, knowledge produced under their roof is evaluated in financial terms and in accordance with its economic function.⁴ In the words of one researcher, ‘We no longer have independent knowledge underpinned by academic freedom, but a knowledge economy where the value of knowledge is decided by political elites on the basis of its utility to them... [T]he role of academia has become one of servicing the status quo rather than challenging it in the name of justice, human flourishing, freedom of thought or alternative visions of the future’.⁵

While it is questionable, and most likely naïve, to assume that there was ever a time when academic knowledge was pursued purely for its intrinsic worth – i.e. knowledge for the sake of knowledge – it is only during the last decades that the *value* of research and knowledge has become thoroughly intertwined with ‘extrinsic’ values driven by economic interests. Knowledge-producing institutions are now expected to pay much greater attention to evidence of national and/or international economic benefits for the research they fund, over and above the contribution it makes to the sum of human knowledge. Even if knowing is still judged to be better than ignorance, within the neoliberal society it appears to have become a value increasingly associated with economic gain rather than with practical wisdom, and personal or social

1. De Regil, A. The Neoliberal Tide 1: The New Global Capitalist System and Its Global Society. In *The Neocapitalist Assault: The Perils of Globalisation and the Path to a Sustainable Global Economy*. Digital Edition: The Jus Semper Global Alliance. 2001. URL: <http://www.jussempere.org/Resources/Economic%20Data/The%20Neo-Capitalist%20Assault/theneo-capitalis.html>; Hill, D. Class Struggle and Education: Neoliberalism, (Neo)-Conservatism, and the Capitalist Assault on Public Education – a Marxist Analysis. In A. T. Costigan & L. Grey (eds), *Demythologizing Educational Reforms: Responses to the Political and Corporate Takeover of Education*. London: Routledge. 2014. pp. 34–67.

2. Roberts, P. & Peters, M. A. *Neoliberalism, Higher Education and Research*. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 2008.

3. Marginson, S. *Are Neo-liberal Reforms Friendly to Academic Freedom and Creativity? Seminar on Ideas and Issues in Higher*

Education, Centre for the Study of Higher Education, The University of Melbourne. 2007. URL: http://www.cshe.unimelb.edu.au/people/marginson_docs/Seminar280507-Marginson.pdf; Anderson, T. Hegemony, Big Money, and Academic Independence. *Australian Universities' Review* 52/2: 11–17. 2010; Reay, D. From Academic Freedom to Academic Capitalism. *Discover Society* 5. 2014. URL: <http://www.discoversociety.org/category/issue-5/>.

4. Chomsky, N. *Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order*. New York: Seven Stories Press. 1998.

5. Reay, D. From Academic Freedom to Academic Capitalism. *Discover Society* 5. 2014. URL: <http://www.discoversociety.org/category/issue-5/>.

6. Cottingham, J. *Philosophy and the Good Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998.

moral good.⁶ The neoliberal demands of the power structures within and outside higher education institutions that distribute funds are thus re-ordering the disciplinary priorities and processes of research, leading to the emergence of new forms of academic subjectivities shaped by the ‘compromise and calculation’,⁷ ‘self-interested competitiveness’,⁸ and ‘compliance, conformity and surveillance’⁹ that ‘entrepreneurialisation’ brings. Increasingly, researchers are pitted against one another as competitors, and pressurized to prioritize benefitting a corporate or organizational interest by ‘chasing after grants, promotions, and conventional research outlets’¹⁰ over thinking critically, acting with civic sensibility, and ‘perhaps feeling their way towards a new [research or knowledge] paradigm’.¹¹ In fact, as Henry Giroux has noted, ‘increasingly within the university, thinking critically and embracing forceful new angles of vision are all too frequently viewed as heresy’.¹² Various authors have written about the increased *standardization* such a climate brings.¹³ As the power structures that fund research ‘intellectually police’¹⁴ the mechanisms of knowledge production in order to standardize – and thereby render marketable – the new knowledge and understanding researchers achieve, research that does not replicate existing designs so as to converge on the ‘leading project’ of the current ‘research market’ risks becoming marginalized and forced out. Within the neoliberal university, where the processes of standardization continue to curtail plurality of perspectives and diversity of methods, negotiating a research path through the confines of socio-economic forces while simultaneously keeping in clear sight the intrinsic value of the pursuit of knowledge and understanding often becomes a political act, requiring political judgement.

As ‘the latest (the last) scion in the family of knowledge in Western society’,¹⁵ the rise of *artistic research* has coincided with these momentous changes taking place in the power structures, strategies and policies governing higher education institutions. While some would like to argue that, historically, artistic practices have always been based on research processes and therefore constituted artistic research (e.g. Malterud 2010), it is the total intertwining of the large-scale socio-economic and cultural circumstances with the recent entry of expert artistic practitioners into academic research scenes that renders *artistic research* an essentially contemporary phenomenon

7. Peck, J. *Zombie Neoliberalism and the Ambidextrous State*. *Theoretical Criminology* 14. 2010. pp. 104-110.

8. Kenning, D. Refusing Conformity and Exclusion in Art Education. *Mute*. 2012. URL: <http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/refusing-conformity-and-exclusion-art-education>

9. Kultz, C. Academies and the Neoliberal Project: The Lessons and Costs of the Conveyor Belt. *openDemocracy*. 2014.

10. Giroux, H. *Neoliberalism's War on Higher Education*. Chicago: Haymarket Books. 2014.

11. Connell, R. *Neoliberalism and Higher Education: The Australian Case*. In *Universities in Crisis: Blog of the International Sociological Association (ISA)*. 2013. URL: <http://www.isa-sociology.org/universities-in-crisis/?p=994>.

12. Giroux, p. 80.

13. Harland, T. The University, Neoliberal Reform and the Liberal Educational Ideal. In M. Tight, K. H. Mok, J. Huisman & C. C. Morphew (eds.), *The Routledge International Handbook of Higher Education*. New York: Routledge. 2009. pp. 511-522; Kenning, D. Refusing Conformity and Exclusion in Art Education. *Mute*. 2012. URL: <http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/refusing-conformity-and-exclusion-art-education/>; Kultz, C. Academies and the Neoliberal Project: The Lessons and Costs of the Conveyor Belt. *openDemocracy*. 2014.

14. Giroux, p. 78.

15. Coessens, K., Crispin, D. & Douglas, A. *The Artistic Turn: A Manifesto*. Leuven: Leuven University Press. 2009. p. 44.

– a contemporary academic discipline. From the moment of their inception, discourses of artistic research have been permeated by political judgements, whether these are explicitly stated or remain as unarticulated assumptions. These judgements often have a doubly-political bent: on the one hand, they are made with the ‘external’ pressures of neoliberal policies in mind – just think of the recent expectation, particularly in the context of Research Councils in the UK and Australia, to articulate and demonstrate the measurable impact of one’s research in funding applications, for example, which necessitates ‘thinking of a good idea that might get funding’, and ‘expressing it in a simple catchy statement that politicians will understand’, making sure it ‘conforms with the government policy’¹⁶; on the other hand, these judgements concern ‘internal’ issues regarding the nature and identity of artistic research as an academic discipline. Debates about the *epistemological* and *methodological* controversies surrounding artistic research – can artistic outcomes constitute research on their own? Can intensely subjective, situated perspectives provide the basis for valid methods that yield ‘scientific’ knowledge? Does artistic research improve artistic practice? etc. – are frequently tinted with the political motives of the authors, who represent one or the other interested parties in the discussion: how one talks about artistic research depends on whether one writes as an artist, as a non-practising academic, an institutional policy maker or enforcer, or an artist-researcher.¹⁷ In order to forge a way forward, those who have been committed to making space for and establishing artistic research as a valid and sustainable discipline with equal ‘rights’ within academia often resort to the language of persuasion and emotion – as in politics – while simultaneously aiming to provide rigorous philosophical and theoretical arguments, and/or case studies of first-rate examples of artistic practice as research. When practitioners of artistic research speak on behalf the discipline, there is almost always a moment that is, for them, ‘existential and political’.¹⁸ For example, Borgdorff speaks of ‘the emancipation’ of the discipline from the scientific paradigm that sets the problematic notion of ‘scientific objectivity’ as the basic aim of research, and writes: ‘We knew we would face tough resistance, and, though that may dampen our spirits from time to time, it is a challenge we can meet’.¹⁹ Other authors speak of overcoming ‘the resistance of established

16. Paul, n.d.

17. As knowledge production never takes place in a culturally neutral ‘void’, academic research in *any* discipline is influenced by various motives that can be identified as ‘political’. What makes the emerging discipline of *artistic research* distinctive in this connection is the confluence of externally motivated pressure to become an active player in the neoliberal research game with the internal requirement to demonstrate – to other, well established fields of knowledge – that it has come of age as an academic discipline.

18. Gritten A. Determination and Negotiation in Artistic Practice as Research in Music. In M. Doğanatan-Dack (ed.), *Artistic Practice as Research in Music: Theory, Criticism, Practice*. Aldershot: Ashgate. 2015.

19. Borgdorff, H. The Debate on Research in the Arts. *Sensuous Knowledge 2*. Bergen: Bergen National Academy of the Arts. 2006. p. 20.

disciplines' and allude to the struggle awaiting artistic researchers in this endeavour.²⁰ The need to be 'bold' in undertaking artistic research,²¹ to have 'the courage' to ask the difficult questions concerning artistic experience and scrutinize the 'ideological battlefield'²² between scholars and practitioners appear just as essential and urgent as rigorous theoretical and philosophical arguments in putting the case forward for artistic research to the scholarly and artistic communities. The discourses that grow out of the commitment of artistic researchers to the discipline at times resemble genres of political discourse, leading to a manifesto,²³ or a declaration of value judgements.²⁴

In comparison to other arts practices such as Design and Visual Arts, which were among the first to embrace artistic, practice-led research, music – particularly music performance – has been a late arrival in the scene of artistic research. Whereas the former already involve established bodies of literature that propose a variety of theoretical positions for thinking and conceptualising the relationship between artistic practice and academic research, a shared discourse on epistemological and methodological issues, and a wide range of examples of creative practice as research, in music performance the sense of a community of artist-researchers, as well as a plurality of views on the ways musical performance and research might be integrated, is beginning to emerge only slowly. In the area of musical performance, we are just starting to engage in substantial and sustained debates about the cultural policies, ideologies, academic discourses, theories and methods that are shaping artistic research in this field.

Since there is a more or less established consensus that one of the defining features of artistic research is '*the exploration of the tacit dimension of knowledge embedded in artistic processes and works*' (italics in original)²⁵, and that 'the places' it 'seeks to investigate and illuminate are those of artistic practices and their inherent knowledge',²⁶ most of the projects in musical performance to date have focussed on performing musicians' artistic *processes* in order to explore and reveal the tacit-embodied, and the expert cognitive-artistic knowledge that drives performance making (e.g. Emmerson 2006; Hultberg 2013). As Hultberg noted, 'Considerations in performance preparation and public presentation of works of music often belong to a tacit dimension of artistic knowledge and are therefore important to reveal'.²⁷ In the context of one of my

20. Scheuermann, A. & Oforu, Y. On the Situation of Artistic Research: An Appraisal. In C. Caduff, F. Siegenthaler & T. Wälchli (eds.), *Art and Artistic Research*. Zurich: Zurich University of the Arts. 2010. p. 202.

21. Lilja, E. Throw the Stones Really Hard at Your Target or Rest in Peace. In C. Caduff, F. Siegenthaler & T. Wälchli (eds.), *Art and Artistic Research*. Zurich: Zurich University of the Arts. 2010. p. 131.

22. Coessens et al, p. 146.

23. Coessens et al.

24. Schenker, C. Value Judgments. In C. Caduff, F. Siegenthaler & T. Wälchli (eds.), *Art and Artistic Research*. Zurich: Zurich University of the Arts. 2010. pp. 154-63.

25. Hultberg, C. Artistic Processes in Music Performance: A Research Area Calling for Interdisciplinary Collaboration. *Swedish Journal of Musicology*. Special Issue on Artistic Research in Music 95. 2013. p.80.

26. Coessens et al, p. 17.

27. Hultberg, C. p. 87.

own artistic research projects, I have emphasized the value of revealing the insider's perspective through the first-person narration of the creative processes the performer engages in, without which the artistic issues involved in performance making would remain unarticulated, and wrote: 'The insider's view on what happens in a musical performance – and why – can be brought to light only through a discourse that takes account of and thrives on the situatedness and the very subjectivity of the aesthetic judgements made by the performer in relation to his or her performance'.²⁸

While one of the primary roles of artist-researchers is thus to make known the insider's expert perspective on art making, this is not the only aim, or accomplishment, of their work. Just as significant is the contribution they can make to unmask 'untruths', and thus advance knowledge, in relation to particular traditions of art making. The art of musical performance in the context of the classical tonal repertoire presents a most remarkable, and possibly unique, case in this connection. Throughout the twentieth century, literature, visual arts, dance and drama have been the site of radical artistic experimentation that challenged the traditional and institutionalised 'rules' of art making. While classical music composition did not remain immune from such radical developments, *classical music performance practice, as a form of art making*, remained untouched by the critically reflective and socio-politically engaged stances and discourses surrounding it. Although the reasons for this state of affairs is complex, arguably the strongest factor has been the deeply-rooted ideology that regards the function of classical performance as the communication of the composer's musical intentions to listeners, and demands that any performative creativity be confined by the expressive limits presumably set by the composer through the symbols on the score. The discourses surrounding music performance in the classical genre have been thoroughly permeated by the ideology of *Werktreue*, largely understood as *Texttreue* – faithfulness to the musical 'work' and faithfulness to the musical score;²⁹ furthermore, the notion of 'the music' is often used interchangeably with that of 'the work'. To give but one, randomly selected, example, one author has written:

We value imagination and originality in performers, but recognize that (normally) this serves the music they perform, helping to illuminate its character or make palpable

28. Doğan-tan-Dack, M. The Art of Research in Live Music Performance. *Music Performance Research* 5. URL: [http://mpr-online.net/Issues/Volume%205%20\[2012\]/Dogantan-Dack.pdf](http://mpr-online.net/Issues/Volume%205%20[2012]/Dogantan-Dack.pdf). 2012. p. 39.

29. In the context of her widely accepted account in relation to the emergence of the regulative concept of the musical work at the end of the eighteenth century, Lydia Goehr has written that 'The ideal of *Werktreue* emerged to capture the new relation between work and performance as well as that between performer and composer... The relation was mediated by the presence of complete and adequate notation... Thus, the effective synonymy in the musical world of *Werktreue* and *Texttreue*: to be true to a work is to be true to its score'. Goehr, L. *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. p. 231.

*its emotional content. By and large, we are not so happy when a performer's imagination distorts or disguises the music on which it is exercised... If it is the responsibility of the performer to realize the composer's intentions, then the first step is, clearly, to try to understand the music as fully as possible... This perspective may be seen as simply a matter of reading a score properly with as full an awareness of its nuances as possible'*³⁰

My purpose here is not to rehearse the various arguments that have been put forward in the musicological literature to criticize the *Werktreue* ideology (e.g. Kivy 1995; Taruskin 1995; Cook 2001; Parmer 2007; Moore 2010). I wish rather to focus on one particular idea that has been pervasive in discourses on musical meaning and performance expression – an idea that is closely related to the notion of *Werktreue*, although it can be argued to have an independent epistemological status. This is the idea that the pitches and rhythms notated in a given musical score exclusively determine their performance expression, which is to be achieved through the (only) correct ‘reading’ or ‘deciphering’ of the musical meaning of the written symbols. This idea was encapsulated in a well-known passage by music theorist Heinrich Schenker who wrote:

If, for example, the Ninth Symphony had come down to us – like most of the works of Sebastian Bach – without express dynamics symbols, an expert hand could nonetheless only place those symbols – according to the content – exactly as Beethoven has done... Performance directions are fundamentally superfluous, since the composition itself expresses everything that is necessary.³¹

While Schenker's words constitute the best-known instance of this widespread view, they are by no means unique; music theoretical and pedagogical texts include an abundance of similar words, the following selections representing two further examples. In his *Traité de l'expression musicale* published in 1874, music theorist and piano pedagogue Mathis Lussy argued that given any page of music:

without annotations and accentuation [marks], [the musician], by simply inspecting, attentively looking over the general contexture³² of the phrases, the arrangement of the rhythmic units, the ascending and descending movements in the melody or the accompaniment, the discontinuities in the progressions by steps or skips, the chromatic

30. Walls, P. Historical Performance and the Modern Performer. In J. Rink (ed.), *Musical Performance: A Guide to Understanding*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. p. 17 & p. 31.

31. Rothstein, W. Heinrich Schenker as an Interpreter of Beethoven's Piano Sonatas. *19th-Century Music* 8/1: 3-28. 1984. p. 5.

32. The word ‘contexture’ was very commonly used both in English and in French during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although it gradually dropped out of use, it still appears in French music theoretical treatises of the nineteenth century. The definition given in *The Oxford English Dictionary* for ‘contexture’ is: (1) the action or process of weaving together or intertwining; the manner in which this is done. (2) the linking together of materials or elements, so as to form a connected structure. (3) weaving together of words, sentences, etc., in connected composition; the construction or composition of a writing as consisting of connected and coherent members.

*alterations, the notes with unusual durational values, etc. will find and indicate the notes and passages where any [performing] artist would provide the accents, the places where he would accelerate, where he would slow down, etc.*³³ [my translation from the French original]

The Russian composer-pianist and pedagogue Samuil Feinberg's words sum up the consensus among performers in this context:

*What exactly does 'reading the musical text' mean? Many people might think that I regard the composer's markings as being of primary importance – those governing tempo, expression, and other nuances. But, in fact, I am referring only to the actual notes themselves. This musical notation in itself tells a pianist so much that if he is capable of assimilating it, then all the composer's other indications regarding performance become self-evident... This means that interpretation [depends]... only on the notes themselves, which any true performer can read, hear, and make perfect sense of.*³⁴ [emphasis mine]

One of the extraordinary aspects of the idea that correct performance expression inheres in notated pitches and rhythms is that it constitutes a totally rare moment of agreement between musicologists, music theorists, music psychologists and performers. And it is in this agreement that the moral basis of a regime sustained by what Daniel Leech-Wilkinson has called 'the performance police', i.e. teachers, critics, producers, promoters, directors, agents, managers, etc. lies.³⁵ When authority is shifted from real people, living in specific historical-cultural – and thereby contingent – circumstances and roles, to an *idea* presumably residing in written symbolic representations (in this case, in musical notation/scores, as the above quotations proclaim), it becomes markedly easier to enforce a contingent moral view as the natural universal law, hiding the authoritarian stances of those who dictate it in each instance of a given kind of cultural practice: conveniently, ethical priorities are no longer drawn from individuals or groups, but from an abstract authority with which one cannot enter debate or rational argumentation. In entering the classical music performance profession, performers thus submit to an ideological contract demanding of them to 'acquiesce to the disappearance of their [artistic] practice behind the musical object'³⁶ as represented by notated symbols; instead of encourag-

33. Lussy, M. *Traité de l'expression musicale: Accents, nuances et mouvements dans la musique vocal et instrumentale*. Paris: Berger-Levrault & Heugel. 1874. p. 3.

34. Feinberg, S. *The Road to Artistry*. In C. Barnes (trans. & ed.), *The Russian Piano School: Russian Pianists and Moscow Conservatoire Professors on the Art of the Piano*. London: Kahn & Averill. 2007. p. 23.

35. Leech-Wilkinson, D. Compositions, Scores, Performances, Meanings. *Music Theory Online* 18/1. 2012. 3.3. URL: <http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.12.18.1/mto.12.18.1.leech-wilkinson.php>

36. Gramit, (D). Music Scholarship, Musical Practice and the Art of Listening. In R. B. Qureshi (ed.) *Music and Marx: Ideas, Practice, Politics*. London: Routledge. 2002. p. 16

ing them to explore the plurality, and understand the contingency of meanings that *any* written symbolic representation implies, this contract obliges them to search for and adhere to an ‘authentic’ meaning that in reality does not exist.³⁷ Artistic freedom gives way to regulated conformity; aesthetic judgement becomes part of a self-perpetuating political regime. Years of indoctrination in a deeply-rooted tradition shapes the belief that if they learn to recognize the musical meaning behind notated symbols by unearthing *the* musical structures formed by melodic, harmonic, rhythmic and metric patterns these symbols imply, performers would have direct access to the *true* expressive content of ‘the music’, and thereby become *true* performers and be admitted to the hall of great minds of music.³⁸

In reality, what is laid down as learning to recognize *the* meaning behind notated musical symbols, i.e. the ‘objective’ expressive content of ‘the music’, amounts to learning to perform canonical pieces of music in accordance with their performance tradition and within the currently accepted expressive style. Contingency is packaged and marketed as universality and necessity. Yet, unless particular performance traditions and styles are invoked, there are no plausible grounds for maintaining that the tonal-rhythmic patterns gleaned from the score of a given piece of music make specific expressive demands on its performance. In a recent article, Leech-Wilkinson has argued that it is unavoidable to read musical scores as imagined performances and that ‘as soon as we imagine music sounding we imagine it in a particular performance style, the performance style current around us’.³⁹ Through a sleight of hand, the current performance style, the current way of performing canonical pieces of classical music, come to represent *the* expressive meaning embedded in the score. Yet, performance styles and traditions change ‘more than even our most progressive current thinking about compositions and their contexts encourages us to suppose’,⁴⁰ as research on historical recordings demonstrate (e.g. Cook et al. 2009; Leech-Wilkinson

37. Various authors have noted that musical notation, by its nature, is incomplete in representing a composition, and offers only a schematic prescription for performance, thereby leaving room for multiple interpretations and re-interpretations: Ingarden, R. *The Work of Music and the Problem of its Identity*. Trans. A. Czerniawski. London: The Macmillan Press. 1986; Godlovitch, S. *Musical Performance: A Philosophical Study*. London: Routledge. 1998; Kania, A. *Pieces of Music: The Ontology of Classical, Rock and Jazz Music*. Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of Maryland. 2005. The point I make here, however, concerns the persistent *ideology* that dictates how this *semantic space*, left open by symbolic notation, is to be occupied by the performer – by setting very narrow limits for creative manoeuvre and stipulating that there is a correct, true, authentic manner of performing, known, unsurprisingly, by the ‘performance police’. This ideology persists even as performance styles gradually change. Leech-Wilkinson, D. Recordings and Histories of Performance Style. In N. Cook, E. Clarke, D. Leech-Wilkinson & J. Rink (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Recorded Music*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2009. pp. 246-262

38. The late pianist Charles Rosen should be mentioned here as a rare example of a musician who was openly critical of the standardization and conformity that the classical performance pedagogy and profession involve. He wrote: ‘When the conservatory imposes a respectably correct performance with the rigor of authority, it not only encroaches on the indispensable liberty of the students, but hinders their artistic development’. Rosen, C. *Piano Notes: The Hidden World of the Pianist*. London: Penguin Books. 2002. p. 100.

39. Leech-Wilkinson, D. Compositions, Scores, Performances, Meanings. *Music Theory Online* 18/1. 2012. 2.1. URL: <http://www.mtosmt.org/issues/mto.12.18.1/mto.12.18.1.leech-wilkinson.php>

40. *ibid.*, 1.3.

2009, 2011). The authority vested in the musical text, as represented by the musical score, in discourses around western classical music performance functions to sanction performances that represent the established tradition as authentic, denying any place to non-standard interpretation. Tellingly, when contemporary authors look for the historical precedents of artistic research in classical instrumental music performance practice, they think of only one name regularly – only one musician, the Canadian pianist Glenn Gould, who succeeded in making a career playing differently. Even as one tries to identify other performers who made careers without conforming to then-current performance styles – Rosalyn Tureck, Sergiu Celibidache, or more recently Ivo Pogorelich – out of hundreds of musicians past and contemporary, one could come up only with a small handful of names. Leech-Wilkinson and I have accordingly argued that ‘Creativity in classical music performance, like freedom of speech, is welcomed so long as nobody is deeply upset: the most successful performers are those who represent the score as it is usually portrayed, but just a little more vividly. A system of education – from ABRSM Grade 1 through conservatoire – and censorship – from examiners to critics, producers and promoters – ensures that the status quo appears to be maintained’.⁴¹

While philosophical arguments and theoretical positions based on empirical evidence can be, and have been, put forward to invalidate this authoritarian ideology dominating artistic practices in the performance of pieces of music from the classical tonal repertoire, arguably the most effective and conclusive means to reveal its ‘untruth’ is the methodological tool that is at the heart of artistic research, namely artistic practice. What the artist-researcher needs to do is to take a classical score, remove all original and/or editorial expressive markings – including tempo, dynamic and character indications – and approach it with an open mind, and open ears to hear beyond the current performances of it, to see if the notated pitches and rhythms indeed imply only one kind of performance expression, which presumably would coincide with the expression suggested by the signs thus removed – and with the expression the composer had in mind when placing them in the score. This is indeed the exercise I have undertaken with reference to Rachmaninoff’s *Moment Musical Op. 16 No.5*;⁴² by removing all performance indications, starting with the ‘Adagio

41. Leech-Wilkinson, D. & Dogantan-Dack, M. *How Creative Can a Musical Practice Be?* CMPCP/IMR *Performance/Research Seminars*. 24 June 2013.

42. The score for this piece is available online at: http://japanese.imslp.info/files/imglnks/usimg/3/3f/IMSLP00341-Rachmaninoff_-_Moments_Musical_5.pdf

Sostenuto' and 'pianissimo' markings at the beginning of the piece, and contemplating *only* the pitches and rhythms in accordance with the grammar of expressivity that is associated with the classical genre (and hence, without attempting to cross over genres by turning a classical piece of music into jazz, for example)⁴³, I have attempted to come up with a reading that makes musical sense *as an example of classical music*, while radically departing from the established tradition of performing this piece⁴⁴ (Audio example: performance of Rachmaninoff's Moment Musical Op. 16 No.5).⁴⁵ The fact that it still works as a persuasive piece of classical music is sufficient to reveal the 'untruth' of the traditional discourse that stipulates a one-to-one correspondence between notated symbols and their performance interpretation and expression. An account of *the process* of developing this interpretation presented in the audio example would explicate the various kinds of expert judgements that played a part in deciding what works and does not work musically and aesthetically. However, it is the 'product' that is most significant for the purposes of the argument I have been advancing in this essay: it is the artistic outcome itself that conveys the message – more powerfully than discursive reasoning and argumentation, in my view – that the emperor had no new clothes all along. To avoid any misunderstanding, I do not put this artistic result forward with the aim of replacing known – and institutionally sanctioned – ways of making persuasive musical performances in the classical genre, but to make legitimate space for non-conforming performances that still make artistic-musical sense and are persuasive, at least to some listeners. The main purpose has been to demonstrate, through artistic research, that what performance pedagogical discourses present to aspiring performers as the only way is in fact only *an option*. Coessens et al. have written that 'Artist researchers will have to counter the pressure both within the arts and from outside to conform to known academic traditions. The kinds of questions that they need to raise and address do not necessarily fit these traditions'.⁴⁶ I would add here the need to resist, when seeking answers to some of the difficult questions concerning artistic practices, the pressure to conform to known artistic traditions. When such questions disturb deeply rooted regimes of practice,⁴⁷ the answers put forward by artist-researchers, in addition to producing knowledge, acquire the quality of speaking 'truth' to power – in this case the power of the 'performance police'; the

43. A discussion of the principles of this expressive grammar (constituted by such practices as phrasing and grouping, among others), and what the consequences of eliminating these principles might be for performances of classical tonal music would be the topic of another essay and another artistic research project. For a discussion of the philosophical issues surrounding expressiveness in music performance, see Doğantan-Dack, M. *Philosophical Reflections on Expressive Music Performance*. In D. Fabian, R. Timmers & E. Schubert (eds.), *Expressiveness in Music Performance: Empirical Approaches Across Styles and Cultures*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2014. pp. 3-21.

44. A traditional or standard interpretation of this piece, as performed by Nikolai Lugansky, is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fl_Udw22tXw

45. Recorded at the Vestry Hall Studio, University of West London, on 15 July 2014. I would like to thank Dr. Simon Zagorski-Thomas and Mark Brocklesby for their assistance during the recording of this performance.

46. Coessens et al, p, 23.

47. One such 'difficult' question is: 'Why are performers driven to such levels of anxiety about stylistic accuracy when a very different reading of a piece would harm no one? Who is hurt by a new interpretation? And if no one, why are [classical] performers put under such constraints?' See Doğantan-Dack, M. & Leech-Wilkinson, D. *Radical Interpretation in Classical Performance*. Recital, workshop, discussion at the University of Surrey. 30 October 2013.

knowledge thus produced generates political overtones, particularly as it simultaneously disrupts the ongoing neoliberal standardization and ‘intellectual policing’ of knowledge production and understanding that threatens to progressively replace the value of critical thinking within higher education with that of developing competitive market skills, and gives ‘students/consumers the impression that they can choose and study highly individual programmes, but in fact treats them to mass-produced competencies in increasingly – within Europe – interchangeable modules’⁴⁸ I would nevertheless maintain that even as those committed to the discipline of artistic research justifiably feel the urgency of taking, asserting, and arguing for political positions in their discourses – whether against the neoliberal agendas that many thinkers have come to regard as antithetical to democratic values⁴⁹, or against disciplinary agendas that attempt to push artistic research through the ‘eye of the needle’ of scientific paradigms⁵⁰ – their greatest power in creating a sustainable future for the discipline will come not from any *a priori* political agenda that aims to carve out a niche within academia either in conformity with or opposition to the expectations of neoliberal higher education policies, but from keeping in clear sight the ‘categorical imperative’ of the academic – and, I would add, of the artist – as ‘truth-teller’.⁵¹ Artistic research will rather draw its strength from continually prioritizing and aspiring to realize the value of scientific and artistic knowledge and truth through artistic research projects, even when these might disagree with some immediate market values and academic managerial interests. Any consequences that might then ripple out from the fulfilment of this (some would say, old-fashioned) value and disrupt the pressures of the neoliberal power structures to ‘funnel artistic endeavour through the restrictive confines of social, economic and political expectations’⁵², will be ‘political’ in the best sense of the term, making sure that the authoritarian tendencies of the gatekeepers of these power structures are kept in check, and the plurality and freedom of artistic expression remain within their sight and at the forefront of our values driving artistic research.

48. Gielen, P. & De Bruyne, P. (eds.) *Teaching Art in the Neoliberal Realm: Realism versus Cynicism*. Amsterdam: Valiz. 2012. pp. 5.

49. Bourdieu, P. The Essence of Neoliberalism. *Le Monde diplomatique*. 1998. URL: <http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu>; Harvey, D. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1995; Giroux. 2014.

50. Coessens et al, p. 21.

51. Bailey, M. & Freedman, D. (eds.) *The Assault on Universities: A Manifesto for Resistance*. University of Chicago Press. 2011.

52. Coessens et al, p. 22.

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About Urgency and Quality in Contemporary Art

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WHEN THE CURRENT secretary of culture of the municipality of Stockholm keeps repeating how happy she is that during her mandate much more art than before has been made possible, there is reason to raise an eyebrow or two. Her redirection of funds has increased the volume of art around, is the claim. And according to her, more art is a positive thing in and of itself. However, the problem now is not that there is too little art but that there is too much substandard art. Today, in Sweden, as well as in other places, we are flooded with rubbish art. Whereas in fact the only thing we need is more *good* art. The flood of substandard art that I have in mind is not “airport art”, “hotel art” or even “art at the doctor’s office”. Instead it is visible in supposedly professional contexts, in art institutions and beyond, in outdoor and indoor public space, in academia and other educational situations. The commercial art market is supporting this development, as can be expected, but so are public funding sources, both centrally and locally. The latter have taken the lead in a place like Stockholm promoting populist programming in municipal art institutions, alienating most of the professional art world. In this way they exemplify the fact that it is how you spend on art and culture which matters, not that you spend. Within the sphere of education the so-called new public management has left its marks on what procedures are allowed, often leading to administrative concerns and generalist approaches taking over.

Hence, the old division between public and private structures in the art world has become less and less tenable, one sign being precisely how their tastes and interests intermingle and even merge. In both cases, what is on offer is not publically discussed, debated or in other ways scrutinized. Instead, the prevalent culture of promotion keeps highlighting and praising whatever art has the biggest budget. The obvious explanation is the decay and partial disappearance of the public media sphere where such deliberations used to take place. Only a few critics keep publishing within mainstream media, and the professional arenas are becoming increasingly self-centred. This can be described as a forking of paths, where the mainstream and the side streams depart from each other with less and less contact between them. The former have the budgets, both public and private, and the media attention, while the latter have the new ideas and ways of working. It is muscles versus brains.

This is one reason why it is necessary to talk about quality again. Not quality in terms of eternal values and canons, quite the contrary. Distinctions should be welcomed, not in order to separate high culture from low culture à la Bourdieu, but in order to distinguish between what is instrumentalized by the commercial and the public sector alike. In a cultural condition marked by assessments and control driven by quantitative measurements, it is urgent to propose and insist on other values than the ones that the commercial market as well as new public management impose on us.

Today quality is about arguing for our case, in relation to the case of others. In this struggle of values curators and directors have to make conscious decisions and communicate their choices of artists, themes, methods etc. Quality is about openly supporting and fighting for something, insisting that this “something” is more important, necessary, and/or relevant than everything else and to constantly revise the criteria driving this. Thus, it is about distinctions, about arguing for “this” and not “that”, but not as arbiters of taste. Instead, it is distinctions as markers for urgency. This urgency can pertain to aesthetics, i.e. articulation and the “how-question”, to subject matter, conditions of production, context, etc. But it requires a certain amount of courage, to be tough and stake claims, which under new public management does not come without literal risks.

This notion of quality is clearly situational, depending on the context and the time, and thus it is performative. It relies on public deliberation, debate and conflict around its definition and constant redefinition. As for myself, I am an eclectic, a “situationist” with a predilection for precision combined with poetics, the bizarre paired with intensity. Art, which in some way pertains to lived reality, whether conscious or unconscious, often manages to engage me. But working curatorially means that this work is set in motion in such a way that the status quo is not taken for granted. As opposed to curating which tends to be “business as usual”, fulfilling the demands of the system and logic in place in ways not dissimilar to apparatchiks. Therefore, how, where and when you make a specific art work go public is at the core of working curatorially. In this there should be space for both affirmation and critique.

In the wake of the establishment of cultural theory and critical studies, and in light of post-structuralism’s deconstruction, old hierarchies have thankfully crumbled. This

1. See B.H.D. Buchloh.
 Conceptual Art 1962–1969:
 From the Aesthetic of Ad-
 ministration to the Critique
 of Institutions. *October*.
 Vol. 55. Winter, 1990. pp.
 105-143.

is yesterday's news. However, today's need to debate quality is different from fifteen years ago, when the crowd around *October* magazine warned precisely against the erosion of knowledge as their canons were questioned. This time around it is to do with publicly asking and challenging what we decide to do, and to acknowledge that absolute notions of quality are being replaced by mutating, context-sensitive negotiations which generate qualities in the plural. So please, don't offer us any more art per se, all we need is *good* art.

Where do revolutions happen nowadays? In the streets, is the most immediate answer. On Tahrir Square, in Zucotti Park and most recently on Maidan Square too. But, just as often, they happen behind closed doors far away from the visibility of outdoor public space and the transparency of democratic decision making. In fact, some of the most profound revolutions take place where iPhones are switched off and TV-cameras are absent, at board meetings and on the desks of bureaucrats.

A revolutionary plan which changed the course of both economy and politics in Sweden was shaped on 21 November 1985 in a villa in the countryside near Stockholm. The board of the Central Bank of Sweden met there in order to come to terms with the weakening economy, decreasing profits for the industry and increasing unemployment. The solution of the board was to make the banking sector autonomous by deregulating the credit market, an initiative endorsed by Olof Palme's social democratic government at the time. This unspectacular, and largely unknown albeit radical, event is the object of the artist Andjeas Eriksson's work *1985*. The work takes the shape of a play featuring the characters who participated at the board meeting, conceived for the villa itself and its surrounding picturesque landscape. It was commissioned by IASPIS (The International Artists Studio Program In Sweden) which itself is part of the state authority The Arts Grants Committee, sorting directly under the ministry of culture.

That the influence of bureaucracies has been growing rapidly since the advent of New Public Management in Western Europe is palpable in most sectors of society, whether the influence is revolutionary or not. Power has moved from the representatives of parliamentary democracy to public and private bureaucrats. A prominent feature in this process is the ever present and impressive volume of reviews, assessments and controls of different kinds. We count, weigh and measure more or less everything, and evaluate the results. The protocols for doing so go by various names: reviewing, inspection, certification, revision and quality control are some of them. The field of contemporary art is as affected by this as anybody else, it is felt in both art works and how organizations operate. But in contrast to art historian Benjamin Buchloh's "the administration of aesthetics", describing conceptual art's attitude towards procedures of bureaucracy¹, it is more to do with methodology, protocols and rituals than visual aesthetics – it is the performance of bureaucracy.

But why do we review and assess so much today? And what are the consequences? One explanation is that the public sector since about twenty years has gone through

a process of “organization making”, i.e., agencies and other entities have strived to become proper organisations. Then it is necessary – understandably – to be definable, measurable and manageable, characteristics coming from steering mechanisms borrowed from business management. In addition to this there has been a tendency to decentralize, which has led to responsibility having moved downwards in the hierarchies. Making sure that this freedom is not used in the wrong way or for disorder to occur, reviews and assessments are useful. This is a prescriptive use: unless you inspect and assess, problems might occur so you better take care of that yourself. But, as we know, reviews and assessments often lead to a demand for more – and presumably better – reviews and assessments. And they then become an instrument of control – to make people do what you want them to do.

When this logic of assessment starts to dominate over other logics, for example, professional logics which are specific to each field of activity, an *imaginary rationality* comes about. Especially when the reviewers and assessors can implement sanctions. As reviewers and assessors rarely can delve into the activities themselves they have to rely on reports, which in turn make the bureaucracy grow, stimulating rituals of control. However, reviews and assessments are often made too narrowly to be learning experiences and the new knowledge which they might produce don't enter the relevant arenas – at the end of the day, change in organizations happens through established power relations and ideology. Not through reviews and assessments. And yet, whereas politicians hang on to the idea that reviews and assessments signal action and engagement, they are in reality replacing political responsibility. The society of reviewing and assessing has in and of itself revolutionized everything from the workday of many a civil servant to how activities in the public sector are understood. A new kind of society has emerged in the wake of the performances of bureaucracy.

For Eriksson this is a fertile ground for his work, how bureaucracies become sites of condensed influence and revolutionary power, a force to reckon with. However, *1985* still waits to be staged. The Arts Grants Committee, through a high-ranking bureaucrat, suddenly erased the play from the board agenda of art projects by IASPIS which had to be approved, not by its director but by its board according to the logic of administration. This makes the context of the commissioning of the play, a state agency which has gone from in the 1990s being a model, one of the most vivid and artist-centric platforms in Europe, to now essentially being ruled by the bureaucracy, even more interesting. In all its banality. Furthermore, IASPIS happens to be the place where in the 2000s the word “bureaucracy” was banned from official use – as already Foucault taught us: real power always tries to conceal itself.

“We are all going to go to hell as a result of reading this,” says one of the members of the Joycean Society in a 2013 film by Dora García that takes the group's name as its title.² Since 1986 this band of enthusiasts has met every week in Zürich to read James Joyce's last novel, *Finnegan's Wake* (1939), together. It took the serious-looking participants eleven years to get through the book, and they are now on the third lap. The

2. Auguste Orts. *The Joycean Society*, Dora García. URL: <http://www.augusteorts.be/projects/73/The-Joycean-Society>

pioneers have aged with the collective reading, remembering when the stairs leading to the meeting room were not an obstacle. Newcomers have joined along the way, and when García and her crew come to spend time with the society, a couple of youngsters were present.

The camera sits in the middle of the room, gently following a humorous prereading chatting about the effects of artists earning too much money and about how to make sure that people are dead before they are buried. The conversation then turns into a discussion based on a close reading of the notoriously opaque book, literally word by word. They debate the meaning of ‘onon, onon’ on page 201 and move on to ‘shabby genteel’, ‘joys of ills’ and ‘peduncle’. Maybe ‘great Scott’ is another way of saying ‘great God’? Meanwhile squeaking chairs and rustling snack-bags contribute to the soundscape, a snow-covered bronze statue of Joyce smoking a cigarette fills the frame and the person holding the suspended microphone suddenly becomes visible.

The atmosphere in the film is intense. Each person has his or her own way of dealing with the text, but it is the extremely concentrated common endeavour of decoding it and, to some degree, understanding the limited number of rules that Joyce supposedly employed in writing the novel, that stands out. It is clear that the participants enjoy what they are doing and that they are unusually knowledgeable – the way nerds tend to be – without being professional historians of literature. Most of the readers are men. Witty and fascinating comments, suggestions and questions pertaining to specific terms fly fast across the room in a performance of collective intelligence at its most beautiful.

Dora Garcia has captured something rare and yet urgent in *The Joycean Society*, even overwhelmingly so: individual passion and commitment being shared and debated with others under strikingly consistent conditions. The scenario could be seen as irrelevant navel-gazing but it is the opposite. It speaks to a contemporary need for depth, continuity and pleasure, without having to think about consequences, whether the time it consumes or the absence of palpable outcomes. It is about a way of acting in the world, a sort of approach that allows for things to mature slowly and precisely.

By doing so, the people involved in reading Joyce not only place art centre-stage at a time when art itself often ends up in the margins of even the art world itself, being pushed aside by celebrity culture, art as an asset class and entertainment. Among so-called critical circles, art has been overrun by discussions on infra-structure and conditions of production: an effect of an increasingly precarious situation for art in general. Like true nerds, the members of the Joycean Society also perform a continuous collaborative engagement without necessarily reaching a conclusion. And the result is an outstanding art work, where the final film benefits from the process of the participants and vice versa. It is an example of urgency and quality at work.

The Silent University (TSU) is an alternative knowledge platform, initiated by the artist Ahmet Ögüt. *The Silent University* is aimed at asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants who, despite having professional backgrounds, cannot practice their profes-

sional skills in their present situation. Like many other initiatives within the so-called educational turn, *The Silent University* adopts the form of an academic program by arranging courses, lectures, and seminars for and by its members and for the general public. At the moment, a group of five lecturers are connected to the university's Stockholm branch; their talks connect to their specific educational backgrounds. The lectures have taken place at ABF (Workers' Educational Association) in Stockholm, as well as at Tensta konsthall, and they have been given in Arabic, Kurdish (Sorani), and Uigurish. Topics have ranged from Kurdish literature and learning techniques to Sharia laws and Syria's legal system.

Listeners who do not speak these languages are also invited to participate—in other words, knowledge will not be made accessible to all. This approach aims at illuminating the loss of knowledge caused by the social structures that silence it. Six mentors are part of the network that *The Silent University* has built up in Stockholm. These mentors work in various ways within core areas of *The Silent University*: asylum activism, local organizing, migration, and antiracism. A reference library is housed in Tensta konsthall and the accumulated knowledge bank is also available on the university's website. To be a member, it is required to donate time and knowledge. In this way an alternative currency is invented—exchanging knowledge instead of money or unpaid voluntary work—through which *The Silent University* generates an alternative form of exchange. At present the university exists in Berlin, Paris, and London.

This project is just one among many educational initiatives making up “the educational turn”. Artists and other cultural producers have, since the late 1990s, started alternative schools, academies and universities, literally across the globe. The impetus is a discontent with the established forms of education and the prevalent understanding of knowledge. In Europe “the educational turn” is intimately linked to the Bologna process and a critique against the standardization and economization of both education and knowledge. A desire to take the matter into your own hands has also fueled this development which as one of its latest examples includes *Open School* in London, a self-organized art education without tuition in a country where fees are pushing away many potential art students.³

Perhaps it is here, in the realm of “the educational turn”, or at least with inspiration from the many recent self-organized educational initiatives, that we can begin a phase of public wrestling over definitions of quality? In this we need to wrestle away the ever more pervasive quantitative notions of quality from the politicians, bureaucrats and other funders who impose them on us. We will not be able to escape the society of assessment and control but we can try and change the terms on which the assessments and the control are being exercised, toward qualitative ones. At the same time as this is a question of hands-on argumentation on the work floor of, on the one hand, art and art institutions and, on the other hand, the media, it is something for academia to take on board.

3. Open School East. URL: <http://www.openschooleast.org/>

An Amateur's Prolegomenon

Editors' note: We invited Maria Fusco to contribute a text to the first number of PARSE based on her practice as an artist writer and educator. We present here Fusco's text in the form of a series of "prose poems" or "entries," written in response to our invitation to consider the question of judgement. This work may also be read in conjunction with previously published work by the author occasioned by her role as writer-in-residence at the Lisbon Architecture Triennale.¹ This is then followed by a coda and series of questions exchanged between the author and the editorial team performing the interchange and generative misprision of different genres.

1. M. Fusco. How Imagination Remembers. *The White Review*. May. 2014. URL: <http://www.thewhitereview.org/features/how-imagination-remembers/>

MARIA FUSCO

Maria Fusco is a Belfast-born interdisciplinary writer based in Scotland working across the registers of fiction, criticism and art writing. She is a Reader at the University of Edinburgh and was Director of Art Writing at Goldsmiths, University of London. Her work is published internationally and is translated into more than seven languages. She is founder/editorial director of *The Happy Hypocrite*, a journal for and about experimental art writing. She was commissioned by Film London to write the screenplay for Gonda a film by Ursula Mayer. Fusco was recently selected for the prestigious Artangel/BBC Radio 4 Open commission for which she will produce BBC Radio 4 programmes and a site-specific performance inside a mountain on the west coast of Scotland, in October 2015.

She is an Hawthornden Fellow, Scotland, and was Writer-in-Residence at Lisbon Architecture Triennale, Whitechapel Gallery, London and Kadist Art Foundation, Paris. Her most recent book is *With A Bao A Qu Reading When Attitudes Become Form* (Los Angeles/Vancouver: New Documents, 2013), and her first collection of short stories *The Mechanical Copula* (Berlin/New York: Sternberg Press, 2011), was selected for an international translation series in French as *COPULATION MÉCANIQUE* (Paris: éditions ère, 2012). mariafusco.net

Terms of assemblage are necessitated by that which needs to be judged through the arrangement of their components. An eight pointed star, stretched within four rising stars, surmounted with a crown. The Marquês' heraldic arms may be found in just two locations in the palácio: situated above the noble gates which butt onto Rua do Século, and on the uppermost landing of the grand central staircase retained as shields by two stone lions. These arms are a mediation. Marquês Pombal, born Sebastião José Carvalho e Mello, was only later conferred with the title of Marquês. Whilst the Carvalho e Mello family may have owned the stars, it was King João V who owned what was above them.

How imagination remembers is twofold, acts of greed and ingenuity. I believe these impulses to be linked, in a narrative sense. Imagination is always greedy, never sated, or full, with the present. Imagination informs the imagineer: I need more! Just as the belly of the compulsive eater must be filled, so imagination can never be stuffed. Memory feeds famished imagination, but memory is a faulty mechanism: a selfish, subjective substance also requiring constant nourishment itself in order to function in any low state.

Memory cannot be entrusted with conservation.

Conservation is a contrary motion pushing and pulling; forever the desire to move forwards, yet looking forever backwards to ensure it is going the right way, doing the right thing. What conservation requires is proof. Conservation needs proof in order to be able to proceed with sureness. This proof is not easy to come by. Detailed systems of discovery and exposure need to be set in place in order to pinpoint such proof. Proof is, of course, always contextual and may only be seen as certain if it may be compared with other, very similar, things, or processes. The definition of verisimilitude depends of course on what sort of proof is it you're after.

The proof of Palácio Pombal is evidenced in what is left behind.

I'm looking at the proof this was a palácio, not that it still is one. I accept. I've come here to experience closely, to try for clarity. And what is called into question, rather what arises as a question from my observations is: How can I be sure?

I am trying to act as a recording device. And such is the difficulty of hearing, of hearing properly that I have had to stand here listening intently for quite some time, three hours to be precise. I am standing here listening, even as I write this, trying not to acknowledge the scraping of my pen's nib on paper. The nib. Trying to listen to what the palácio wants to tell me, I'm sure most of it I can't understand, or maybe I understand in my own way, perhaps succeeding only in getting it wrong. The nib. Complete accuracy in listening is not possible yet essential, making the effort after all is respectful towards the person, or thing, trying to tell you something. The nib.

I have sometimes pretended to know or to understand what I did not know or understand. I have done this in an attempt to avoid embarrassment, shame, my lack of knowledge or comprehension, my ignorance. I continue to do this. But not today. It is a useless method to move through the palácio. To acknowledge publicly you do not know, to try to listen, to understand in the moment is more useful and forceful. Forceful, in that such listening responds with sensitivity to force.

Shame. Do I decree Palácio Pombal an underwhelming space?

Is time here shot through with my fancy to assess a real time palácio, not a past tense palácio?

Is the palácio not the site people such as myself access often, or for any length of time, how then to calibrate if this is an extramundane space?

Why should I stay here?

Why should I not stay here?

Is it necessary for me to sink air, to inhale and exhale dust in order to be in charge?

Where are the places I may more easily adapt to my own scale?

Shall I attempt to normalise being here through a donation, give here back to myself with the sole aim of making it more familiar and therefore useful?

Which phantom should be here to greet me?

This room has been painted white to resemble a contemporary art gallery. Facing west onto the garden, its four walls are regularised into tall, blank surfaces that serve the purpose of pointing my gaze upwards towards the stucco ceiling. Because white gives me less to look at, it makes it easier for me to focus on that which is not white. My eyes, I now realise, are trained to require large white spaces to see detail more efficiently, but the white in this room is not welcome. The white in this room disrupts not only the proportions of the walls themselves, but also the four windows, and the creaking door.

This white is imported, it doesn't belong.

Sun catches the particles filling the air around me, filling this city. As I catch the light, I have function, I have use. I am often used to draw attention to that which is not me or mine. White paint, not I, a lens to help the lazy eye identify with surety that which is the most important to see.

And which of these things I spy should I choose to tell you about? It is necessary for me to numerate in order to properly tell, but what does description really tell you about being here? About the opacity of history and the normalisation of trace as a tool to group what has gone before? My intention, to be honest, is somewhat an act of subjective capture, which I hope to sustain without evidence, without the appearance of research and the hammering in of the nails of historical fact. Just as the beams hold themselves together to retain the openness of this palácio, so its collective histories are a desirable amalgam of detail to be inserted here.

Coda

An exercise in choice, a real-time reportage of Palácio de Marquês de Pombal in Lisbon, Portugal. Produced as one method in my role of writer-in-residence at the Lisbon Architecture Triennale field, in the abandoned seventeenth century palácio, built by the inventor of the grid system, the rebuilder of Lisbon. Examining the affective, physical vulnerability of the decrepit palácio; utilising the very surface of description as a means of critical judgement; giving materials voice; restoring evaluative purpose to the amateur, to form a prolegomenon of mediated histories and research.

Dialogue

PARSE: In your coda to the text(s) you speak of “utilising the very surface of description as a means of critical judgement; giving materials voice.” Throughout the texts there is a recurrence of the question of recording / listening, understanding / describing, perceiving / registering... of “verisimilitude” and “proof”: We are interested in the way in which these movements between an opening of perception and a disclosing of encounter with the “object” are woven through the texts announcing – or enacting – that judgement is already at work in the preliminary apprehension of the “object” – in this case the Palácio. This question of the adequacy of a means of disclosure – “the surface of description” – to the material occasion of perception/description seems on the one hand both something longstanding and well-established within the history of European aesthetic reflection and also as something that has become entirely contemporary by virtue of a renewed engagement with questions of “object” in ontology and phenomenology. On the other hand, the question of

the writerly medium of description might direct us to questions of the material specificity of representational means and genres – (the scratching of “the nib,” not the clattering of the keyboard / meditation, not reportage). Where do you position your engagement with these problematics? Is it with reference to a longstanding tradition of the rhetoric of representation or with reference to this recent turn to the “object” ... or is it oriented to something entirely different from these?

MF: I met recently with a very interesting geochemist; we are trying to find the right way to work together on a project I’m researching. In attempting to articulate how he and his colleagues extrapolate data from rock he told me “We *listen* very closely to what it has to tell us.”

The Stone Tape is a BBC TV ghost story first broadcast in 1972. In the film, a group of acoustic scientists chance upon how and what the stone *bears* and *records* across time. The stone is always on, never off.

There is a hierarchy of rhetoric and representation between the two examples I give. Rock is the primary non-representational source, as aggregate non-linear matter. Stone is the secondary representational source, as processed, dispossessed material.

PARSE: In your elaboration of a critical reflection in the act of art writing itself you create a crossing of many genres – the poetic text, the diaristic text, the artist’s statement, the critical meditation, the report, the performative text, etc. In contemporary art writing we have seen a resolute turn to experimental writing, poetic performance and the movement to cross between poetry and “visual” arts (perhaps an unhappy term). This movement across genres, and across forms, might be seen to present a challenge to questions of judgement – in as

much as the canons of literary criticism (such as they are) and the discursive ebullience of contemporary art discourses, as well as the massively expanded textual productivity of internet culture, would seem to create a radically complex and heterogeneous space of “writing”. In what way do you navigate these issues? Or are these questions not centrally relevant for your practice because you are rather more focused on the specificity of each occasion of writing?

MF: Two years ago I had to locate an allotted teaching room in an unfamiliar university block in Copenhagen. I’d been given instructions, all doors were open, so I entered the building with ease. I passed up through the narrow stairwell to the fourth floor, I turned a tight scuffed corner and looked down to see how the wall met with the speckled terrazzo floor at my feet. As I did this, I was overcome with an extremely strong sense of *déjà vu*. I have definitely done this before, I thought. This was a feeling I never experience whilst writing.

PARSE: The relationship between judgement and public-ness is a complex matter in the development of the system of the fine arts: arguably it is precisely through the fact of a public discussion of judgements of works of art that the fine arts achieve their identity in European modernity – i.e., that through public debates on judgements of merit that some activities become attached to an aesthetic reflective discourse (e.g., the pre-Revolutionary Salons and the emergence of a critical discourse in response to a viewing public.) In what ways do the questions of writing as a public activity and of judgement as an intrinsic part of the writing process, as you present it, interact? We are thinking here of your own work in publishing *The Happy Hypocrite* and in orchestrating a public space for art writing that moves across a number of different “scenes”?

MF: We are no longer needed by what we created.

The Naked Truth: A Pictorial View of Justice

RUTH HERZ

Ruth Herz studied law in Geneva, Munich and Cologne where she earned her doctorate in law. She was a judge at the court of Cologne, Germany since 1974 until 2006. She introduced the 'victim offender mediation and reparation' scheme as an alternative sanction for juvenile offenders to the German legal system for which she received the Medal of Merit (*Bundesverdienstkreuz*) of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1998. From 2001 – 2005, while on leave from her judicial position, she played the part of the judge in a daily fictional court series on German television. She has taught criminology at the University of Toronto and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. From 2006 – 2010 she was

Associate Researcher at the Centre for Criminology of the University of Oxford and was a visiting fellow at Princeton University in 2010-2011. She is currently a visiting professor at the School of Law, Birkbeck College, University of London. She is interested in law and popular culture especially in law and images. She is working on the role and the everyday practice of judges through drawings produced by a judge while sitting on the bench as well as on the portrayal of justice on television. She has published extensively. Her latest book *The Art of Justice: The Judge's Perspective* was published by Hart Publishing, Oxford in 2012.

THE IMAGE OF the blindfolded *Justitia* holding the scales and a sword is deeply rooted in our Western culture and represents fair and unbiased justice. The image has long performed an important symbolic role, legitimising justice and state power. Accordingly, judges' decisions, publicly pronounced in court, are largely accepted and respected by the populace. However, few people ever witness a judicial process. They are generally only exposed to second-hand accounts from the courtroom via mediated texts and images. These reports have the potential to boost or undermine public confidence in the justice system.

The practitioners in the courts profess to know better – only they ensure the consistency, integrity and impartiality of the judicial process. They believe they can uphold the image that has been cultivated over time. Judges protect their anonymity and deliberately avoid any exposure of their thinking or inner feelings. They have therefore been reluctant to put pen to paper and to express their private thoughts on their profession and its practices in autobiographies and memoirs. This reticence explains why we are still faced today with the same enigma of how judges feel, see and think as was shrewdly expressed by John Selden (1584–1654): ‘We see the judges look big, look like lions, but we do not see who moves them.’¹

In an age of performativity, fluidity of identity and otherness, the judiciary can no longer remain untouched. Due to judges' reticence to reveal more than their legal way of thinking in their writings, judicial stability and continuity must be questioned through new methods. W.J.T. Mitchell has long argued that there has been what he calls a “pictorial turn” in contemporary culture and theory, in which images, pictures and the realm of the visual have been recognized as being as important and worthy of intense scrutiny as the realm of language.² It is well known that lawyers privilege text in relation to images by assuming the precision and transparency of language as opposed to the simplicity and opacity of images. However, deciphering, decoding and interpreting images reveal their complexity and deeper meanings. Applying such an approach to the practice and theory of law may indeed provide a key to the anatomy of judgecraft. A fortuitous discovery of a hitherto unknown wealth of vivid, fascinating

1. J. Selden. *Judge. Table Talk*. 1689.

2. See the ground-breaking book by W.J.T. Mitchell. *Picture Theory: Essays on verbal and visual representation*. Chicago. University of Chicago Press. 1994.

and unique drawings of courtroom scenes sketched by a judge while sitting on the bench alerted me to such a possibility. The images are saturated with clues as to the judge's way of thinking and habitus, and shed light on the factors that shape, motivate and move him in the process of reaching judgment.

Judges are educated and trained to 'think like lawyers', enabling them to interpret and apply the law, and so to end up with a cogently formulated decision. The legal method, however, leads judges to 'skeletonise' real-life stories. Judgecraft is therefore, to a great extent, an exercise in stripping stories of their many personal aspects and paring them down, so that they fit neatly into the judge's way of applying the law. The gatekeeping function of their way of thinking keeps judges in their safe space. Although the system does give judges discretion to make personal choices, based on observations and interrogations in court, they would be sure to emphasise that those choices are grounded in the law and are barely related to their own personalities.

Judges' fascination with rules becomes part of their persona. Neither in their studies nor in their practical training are judges led towards compassion and care. These have been rooted out of the 'legal imagination'.³ The ideology of interpreting and applying the law objectively does not necessarily mean that judges have no empathy and no likes or dislikes towards the people in the courtroom. However, they are reluctant to admit those feelings even to themselves, in order to maintain their objectivity and fairness. Hubris and remoteness may, after all, only be a façade behind which judges hide their own inner conflicts, which they must quietly take home with them.

Entering the judiciary, however, entails more than the lawyer's way of thinking. Appointment as a judge marks an initiation into a prestigious guild which bestows dignity and honour on its members, distinguishing them from other members of society. Judges acquire their habitus by incorporating past experiences, socially produced in their peer group, into the self which becomes their second nature.⁴ Consciously and unconsciously, judges gradually adopt a certain aura and gravitas. Educated to believe that they embody the key values and virtues of the justice system, judges acquire this identity and expect the public to fix its gaze on their professional façade. The values not only form the basis of judges' social identity, but also help to forge the bonding between them and their common judicial culture. Court rituals, architecture, language and the judges' formal attire all reinforce this. Entering through a door reserved for judges alone, they sit on an elevated chair, swathed in their robes, concealing their body and soul from the outside world. And yet, unwittingly, factors other than the legal way of thinking and judicial habitus seep into their judgments. History, social background and gender are attributes of the judicial process.⁵ These are the ingrained personal elements of the judges' human experience.

Throughout his career in northern France, from 1929 to 1969, Judge Pierre Cavellat produced hundreds of uncensored, lively, colourful drawings of courtroom scenes as they unfolded before him. They depict the courtroom space and architecture, as well as the actors in the courtrooms where he presided. They reveal in a candid and immediate fashion the deeply hidden thoughts, ambiguities, emotions – if not indeed the fantasies – of a judge going about his profession.⁶ The uniqueness of the drawings is that they literally capture an ephemeral moment in court, which by definition

3. J. B. White, *The Legal Imagination*. Boston. Little Brown. 1973.

4. P. Bourdieu. *La noblesse d'état. Grandes écoles et esprit de corps*. Paris. Les Éditions de Minuit. 1989.

5. C. Thomas with N. Balm-
er. *Diversity and Fairness in
the Justice System*. London.
Ministry of Justice. 2007.

6. R. Herz. *The Art of Justice*.
Oxford. Hart Publishing.
2012.

7. L. Moran. Every Picture speaks a thousand words: Visualising Judicial Authority in the Press. P Gisler, S Steinert Borella and C Wiedmer (eds.). *Intersections of Law and Culture*. Basingstoke. Palgrave Macmillan. 2012.

8. M. Foucault. *Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison*. London. Penguin. 1977.

would disappear without a trace. Cavellat brought his pens and pencils into the courtroom hidden in the sleeve of his robe. He did not carry sheets of paper (which might have detracted from his dignity) and therefore used any scrap of paper to hand on the bench. On the surface, the drawings may seem to convey realistic and objective renderings of courtroom scenes, but they reveal the way in which his mind was working, what he was seeing and what he chose to ignore. After all, we see with the tools we ourselves have constructed. The pictures, therefore, not only give insight into the workings of his judging, but also into the connections between the inner and outer worlds in which it is embedded. While drawing, Cavellat was discovering the physical characteristics, feelings and individualities of the people before him in court, but was possibly also attributing certain qualities to them. In his drawings, his 'seeing' thus becomes visible.

Depictions of proceedings in a court of law are well known. In the absence of cameras in the courtroom they usually form the pictorial part of court reporting by the media. Although they purport to be objective renderings of the hearing they clearly have their own agendas accommodating the needs of the media.⁷ Unlike other court artists, who are onlookers, Cavellat the judge, who is the main actor in the courtroom, takes for granted his own perspective, which is reversed from that of the other participants. His perspective allows him to oversee the whole courtroom, giving him the kind of control exercised by power and knowledge, through his mere presence.⁸ This perspective corresponds with his self-perceived role in court – that of the ideally independent, unbiased and fair judge in his quest for the truth, who has shed his own identity.

The images convey how the judge feels at home in the courtroom and in his chambers, among his books and files. He is, of course, also familiar with the court building, with its stairways, vestibules and corridors. He can measure his steps and use his voice effectively, knowing the acoustics of the spaces. Cavellat's pictures likewise reveal that the judge's lead role in the theatrical show of a court trial mutates to an even bigger role: that of the director. The judge indeed is not merely listening to the people before him: he has read what can be regarded as the script – the file containing the investigation. When reading and listening to narratives, the judge imagines them; he pictures them. The event unfolding in court – an event at which he was never present – inevitably and perhaps even unconsciously evokes images in his mind. Indeed Cavellat's preparatory notes on a case included small sketches of the events. With this experience and knowledge, he becomes the *metteur en scène* typecasting the other roles in the drama, or rather in the re-enactment of a drama.

Judges feel that their role compels them to stand above normal mortals and to repress their own temptations. This lifestyle stands in contrast to that of the lawyers, who have chosen a career that provides them with money rather than power. Cavellat's drawings therefore represent the vain, self-satisfied lawyers, comfortable in the courtroom, showing off to one another and sustained by mutual solidarity. Occasionally he spots their insensitivity to the suffering of their clients and the human tragedies they face. He has watched them grow into their roles and habitus. He is, after all, privy to their legal, as well as their rhetorical, abilities, deficiencies and weaknesses, and often

also to their personal secrets. He appropriates the lawyers' gestures of passion and involvement in their fight for the rights and the freedom of their clients in court, only to empty them of meaning and ridicule them.

Cavellat depicts the 'lower half' of society, mostly accused of petty crime. Many of these drawings date from the dire days of unemployment and the economic slump of the 1930s. Cavellat sees the labourers, peasants and fishermen as often miserable, stooped, embarrassed and fidgeting in court. He focuses on their hands, which often reveal what they try to conceal in their facial expressions. He presents them in their ill-fitting clothes that they probably only wear to weddings and funerals, and holding their caps submissively in their hands. Responding to his authoritative gaze, many of them seem to accept their place in society and the injustice of poverty. Resigned in their 'docile bodies', they do not even display anger or revolt towards the social injustice. Does he resent them for this? It seems, on the contrary, that he empathises with them. An example of this is the drawing of the '74 year old accused of theft of an old coat'. It demonstrates that Cavellat considers it cynical to blame this poor old man for



Fig. 1

having stolen a coat, when it was probably the only way for him to survive the cold (fig. 1). Here he displays his attitude towards the state and the law, symbolised by the guards and the book of law, neither of which surely is adequately equipped to deal with the tragedy of the old man.

In the best liberal French tradition, Cavellat manifests his loathing of the hypocritical bourgeoisie, which has much to conceal. In a picture of an elegant, self-confident accused, he expresses his distaste on paper by noting: 'the colonel who sleeps with his daughter-in-law and beats his daughter'. In the drawing, the colonel appears relaxed and comfortable, confident that he has nothing to fear, being among his own class. He is therefore oblivious to the effect his behaviour has on the judge, in the face of the serious accusation (fig. 2).

When it comes to women, Cavellat's drawings highlight their feminine curves, slender waists, stylish clothes, lipstick, rouge and even nail polish. It seems he is resorting to the so-called 'chivalry' of male judges towards women in court, which allegedly affects their judgments. It supposedly protects women from the full rigour of the law, so long as they adhere to their traditional role.⁹ It is most likely, though, that the images exposing the paternalism of the male judge towards women in court was Cavellat's way of coping with female seduction – a danger which could threaten his judicial integrity and professional standing. However, taking a closer look at Cavellat's gaze on women, it is not as homogeneous as it seems at first sight. He sees far beyond women's beauty and charm. Some of his images represent independent, strong women, returning his gaze



Fig. 2

9. O. Pollak. *The Criminality of Women*. Philadelphia. University of Philadelphia Press. 1950. This controversial work was heavily criticised by, among others, F. Heidensohn. *Women and Crime*. London. Macmillan Press. 1985.

10. I discussed the artistic sources of Cavellat's images with the leading art historians Caroline Elam, London, and Marilyn Aronberg Lavin, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.

11. K. Fisher-Taylor. *In the Theater of Criminal Justice: The Palais de Justice in Second Empire Paris*. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1993.

12. J. Resnik and D. Curtis. *Representing Justice*. New Haven. Yale University Press. 2010.

13. See the insightful L. Mulcahy. *Legal Architecture*. London. Routledge. 2010.



Fig. 3

He clearly places the public in the lower class of society, distanced spatially from authority, by confining them to a tight space far away from himself. By including the sign '*Défense de cracher*' (Do not Spit) on the wall behind them, he makes it clear that he regards the public as threatening and 'dirty'.¹¹ This is a far cry from the conventional perception of the public gallery as a space where observation and debate take place. For Cavellat, the public is associated with danger, which must be contained.¹²

Cavellat provides another visual contribution to the discussion of the politics of courtroom space¹³ in his drawing of an 'attempt at reconciliation' meeting. In French family law, this is a step in the divorce procedure which takes place in the judge's chambers prior to the formal divorce proceedings in the courtroom. Cavellat acknowledges the problems that such a meeting in an atmosphere of intimacy entails for the litigants, as well as for the judge (fig. 4). He feels the need to shield himself from exposing himself as all too 'human' and too 'accessible' to the parties. Although the judge is not physically elevated in the setting of his office, Cavellat keeps his judicial perspective raised above the couple. He further establishes a distance between himself and the parties by turning his desk into a moat of protection from the wife and the husband. He draws a clear pencil line around his desk to mark the boundary between his space and that of the parties. The desk is testament to his judicial role, strewn with books of law and legal papers, as well as his large blotting pad and inkwell. Wearing his judge's robe, he is holding his pen, signifying that it is he who must and will make a decision. The couple is already divorced from one another mentally and physically, sitting far away from each other. The distance between them and their incompatibility, demonstrating that life has taken them in different directions, are obvious. The judge is facing the couple and is allegedly trying to appreciate their different points of view; but he does not conceal that he is mostly intrigued by the woman, who gives the impression of being in control, perhaps even trying to lure the judge into seeing her point of view. He therefore positions her as far away from him as possible, defining her as virtuous and unattainable for him, thus preventing him from getting carried away. In this drawing, Cavellat discloses that he does not confine himself to the strictly legal aspects of the case – an interpretation that is corroborated by subsequent paintings of this scene, in which Cavellat gives free rein to his fantasies.



Fig. 4

The inner world and meanings of Cavellat's courtroom drawings become more explicit, yet also more ambivalent, ironical and symbolic, in his paintings. In contrast to the immediacy of the drawings, his paintings seem to be a reflection of his thoughts and emotions, which he let flow freely at home. Looking back on his career, he is cognisant of the complex and unresolvable nature of many of the conflicts he had to cope with as a judge.



Fig.5

A good example is his reflection in a retrospective painting of a mysterious stranger in the public gallery who caught his eye during a trial. Here Cavellat shows a different attitude to the public in court, exposing the complexity of his attitude to the subject. He places the stranger in the central axis of the courtroom, in the middle of the front row of the elevated public gallery, where he first noticed her. She seems to symbolise the transparency of the court, being dressed in pellucid virginal white (fig. 5). I believe she is more than that and represents the judge's conscience, his *superego*. She is overlooking his actions in court and is aware that he is living out his fantasies while seeking the naked truth that

is so often shocking. The inside of the courtroom space below, where the action is taking place, has a policeman in uniform – representing the state, with its controlling presence and power – who remains stiff, impersonal and devoid of feeling while the judge interrogates a beautiful woman. Inspired by a Venus by Lucas Cranach,¹⁴ she is naked except for a red hat. If we look at the diagonals of the painting, the mysterious transparent white virginal lady is in line with the head and face of the nude. Another diagonal connects the leering, lascivious lawyer with the nude's erotic pubic hair and points to her mound of Venus. Is Cavellat uncovering his own desire? Expressing desire is shocking for a judge, whose image must remain that of a serious, modest man of justice performing his judicial role.

The painting, I believe, alludes to his commitment and heavy responsibility to uncover the truth – the naked truth. This aim sounds simple and straightforward, but as soon as he is confronted with the problem on the bench, the simplicity mutates into complexity. Divesting the body of clothing is a well-known metaphor for the truth being exposed. Much of our life is hidden by costume, which is custom or code; but when our bodies are uncovered, the naked truth is discovered – and it is often shocking.¹⁵ Pictures of clothed men observing the nude bodies of women evoke the ritual of power: while remaining fully clothed, they evaluate the naked female bodies. But Cavellat does not share power with the lawyers in the courtroom. On the contrary, he fashions the lawyer into a voracious animal and gives him the features of a pig. Uncovering the woman he is questioning neither debases her nor renders her defenceless. Rather, he sees her nudity as a state of grace.¹⁶ The nude has her own dignity and power: she looks directly at the judge, and so at the viewer of the painting, thus implicating both into the painting. The nude herself becomes simultaneously the observer and the observed.

14. I discovered Cavellat's drawing attached to a reproduction of Cranach's painting.

15. See the pioneering, original and philosophic book about the relationship between dress and the law by G. Watt. *Dress, Law and Naked Truth*. London. Bloomsbury. 2013.

16. G. Agamben. *Nudities*. Stanford. Stanford University Press. 2011.

17. C. Valier. Looking daggers: A psychoanalytical reading of the scene of punishment. *Punishment and Society*. 2(4). 2000. pp. 379–94.

I now return to Justitia who, as we know, is portrayed as pursuing crime in order to punish fairly. Cavellat alludes to her in a subversive way by turning the theme into its opposite in his painting *La Justice consolant le crime* (Justice Consoling Crime) (fig. 6). Cavellat's Justitia looks human and motherly. She descends to the dark cell to console the criminal, who is feeling guilty and dejected by his own worthlessness. She warmly embraces the criminal she herself has sentenced. Cavellat's Justitia is not blind. She closes her eyes because it pains her to see the man suffering. Justice and crime meet, both wishing to repair the damage they have caused. Far from painting an abstract concept or an allegory, Cavellat is dealing with his own personal experience of punishing. The act of punishing is a practice that may entail pleasure or enjoyment, satisfying the sadistic impulses of man, denied and overridden by a sense of guilt. Punishing may, however, also cause suffering – not only to the accused, but to the judge as well. Little is known about how the act of inflicting punishment affects either judges' emotions or their reason.¹⁷ This is where the burden of being a judge and the loneliness of making a decision is most distressing. Cavellat, though, does not shy away from dealing with his own inward gaze, reflecting the loneliness, the pain and the guilty feelings of a judge.

Increasingly Pierre Cavellat narrated the *comédie humaine* from a bitter angle. And yet he never lost his light touch and humour, a reflection of his humanist beliefs and *bon vivant* personality. His unique and rare pictures certainly transcend the time, place and culture in which they were produced. Far from providing a simple picture, the drawings and paintings present an intricate one, embodying the conflicting



Fig. 6

thoughts and emotions which judges have to juggle when judging. Far from confirming the notion of the impersonal and remote judge, Cavellat's art illustrates the complexities of judging, allowing a *coup d'oeil* into 'what moves the judge'. The dilemma, however, is that while demystifying the judicial image, and perhaps even leading to fairer judgements, it is likely to be carried out at the risk of undermining the myth of the unbiased judicial authority.

Strange Teaching: The Artist as Excellent and Miserable Teacher

RAINER GANAHL

From 1986 until 1991, Rainer Ganahl studied at the University of Applied Arts Vienna (Peter Weibel) and the Kunstakademie Düsseldorf (Nam June Paik). He was a member of the 1990/91 Whitney Museum Independent Study Program in New York. His best known work, *S/L* (Seminars/Lectures), is an ongoing series of photographs, begun in 1995, of well-known cultural critics addressing audiences. The photographs, taken in university classrooms and lecture halls, not only show the lecturer but also the listeners

and students in the audience. In a similar way, he documented his own process of learning an "exotic" language (e. g., Basic Japanese) as an art project. In his *Imported-Reading Seminars* held from 1995 onward, the group-study of theoretical works from specific countries were documented on video. His latest exhibition *El Mundo* was recently listed as one of the top exhibitions of 2014 by the *New York Times*. Rainer Ganahl represented Austria at the 1999 Venice Biennale.

Editors' note: We invited Rainer Ganahl to contribute a text to the first number of PARSE based on his practice as an artist and educator. Having been long aware of Ganahl's critical work on education¹, and on celebrity intellectual culture², we were especially interested to invite a contribution that could mark the intersection of questions of judgement with questions of contemporary art education. In making our invitation, we cited a recent text by Ganahl, that was published in *Brooklyn Rail*, where he asserted that:

*Education as well as any other form of cultural work – including art making - should open up possibilities for everybody to develop their own criteria of success and create their own flexible, multi-dimensional, alternative grids as frame works of viable and sustainable references in which to operate and communicate.*³

We are very pleased that our invitation was accepted, but also that the artist subsequently entered into a dialogue with us in respect of the positions rehearsed in his provocative and challenging text. We present here Ganahl's original text which has the sub-title – "the artist as excellent and miserable teacher" – written in response to our invitation, which is then followed by a series of questions exchanged between the author and the editorial team.

1. See for example Ganahl's 1997 guest-curated show at Generali Foundation in Italy "Education Complex." URL: <http://foundation.generali.at/en/info/archive/1997-1995/exhibitions/educational-complex.html>

2. See Ganahl's S/L (Seminars/Lectures) series ongoing since 1995. URL: http://www.ganahl.info/sl_description.html

3. R. Ganahl. Manifesto for an Education Beyond the Power Grid. *The Brooklyn Rail*. February. 2013. URL: <http://www.brooklynrail.org/2013/02/artseen/manifesto-for-an-education-beyond-the-power-grid>

WHEN I FIRST CAME into contact with art schools, their professors and teachers, I realized quickly that they affected students differently. My first art professor was Peter Weibel. I had recently graduated with a Master's degree in philosophy and history from a regular university in Austria, where respect was gained in discussion through contributions based on knowledge and seniority. At my Viennese art school, attitude, social positioning and quasi-tribal politics ruled and respect was acquired through the proximity to professors and ruling art world VIPs. I couldn't relate to any of that. I didn't even understand their games properly. Being unable to adapt to these new art school hierarchies made me look something of an oddball to my fellow students. I soon got the impression that Weibel too perceived me in a similarly non-favorable way. All this eventually became unbearable for me. As a consequence I showed up only for the few occasions when Weibel gave a talk. But these few presentations by him, and the reading of his texts, altered my ideas about art and helped me to re-orient my interest and visual research. Weibel also let me look through *Artforum*, *Flash Art* and other current art-journals and documentation which in 1985 were not readily available in Vienna. There was no internet and libraries did not offer foreign art magazines and articles on time. He taught me not only where to find information but also why something was important and relevant and why other things were not.

Weibel's influence on my learning and understanding, despite the disharmony between us, was rather strong. This stands in contrast to the experience with my next principle art teacher, Nam June Paik at the Academy of Fine Arts in Dusseldorf. He was a love affair for anyone who encountered him. He was funny, incredibly generous, helpful and he liked us all. But I felt I didn't really learn more than that which had been already communicated through his work and all books about him. I liked him and his art works a lot but he didn't influence my perspective the way Peter Weibel had previously done. Weibel was very straightforward and people feared his opinions and judgment, something I needed at the time.

The next stop along my educational path was the Whitney Independent Study Program (ISP). Coming from Europe in 1990, I entered into an intellectual climate at the height of a paradigm shift characterized by postcolonial studies and an orientation towards popular culture. The ISP repositioned my previous knowledge with respect to these new prerogatives and perspectives, in a way that continues to mark my practice to this day. Investigating Euro-centrism and cultural arrogance, I could use myself as a good and readily available exemplar. I came to better understand myself and my biased cultural background, a process that is still ongoing, hence, I'm still unlearning. To this day, I am fundamentally marked by these educational experiences and I see or read nearly everything through these questions regarding representation and the dynamics of power. But again, it seemed that the more I learned from my teachers the less well I got along with them. There I had the honor to study with Hal Foster, Benjamin Buchloh, Mary Kelly, and Yvonne Rainer among others.

The reason for mentioning all these wonderfully fortunate (though they did not always end well) encounters, is simply to show that one doesn't need to get along with a teacher in order to learn something. Not to care about teachers is also consistent

with my preferred autodidactic approach to education. This all should offer an explanation and an apology as to why I tell students what I tell them, and why I am not so concerned whether they like me or not. I have had students quit because of my criticism or my disinterest. I do not think that Art School ought to be a client-oriented service station, seeking to make students feel good about themselves. The constant flux of networked *Selfies* and *Likes* can do that job better. I therefore define art education also as a clearing house that points towards the Exit door and hopes to provide immunization for people from the art virus. I have seen students' contaminated by this virus to the degree that they ended up perceiving their lives as failures even though they were highly successful in other fields or trades but never could overcome the fact they had not succeeded as artists.

What should art education really be since it cannot be just reduced to telling people to stop making art?

I find it important to scare people out of this madhouse of false promises and irredeemable expectations. I welcome a negative attitude as part of an important component for any ambitious art education. In fact, I have learned most by people who trashed me when I started my way with writing and art making. Artists and poets live in a world of too much supply and only little if any demand to put it economically (and we have not yet even begun here to speak of money.) The chances for anyone in art school to come out and make a living, or to succeed critically in the art world are very, very small. Speaking for myself in the role of a teacher, I tell students they count and I try to encourage and disrupt; create obstacles and disillusion; confusion and surprises; break early-adapted formulas; facilitate the exit or transfer out of art making; offer non-sense and an insight into the miserable state of affairs; and finally push when they are about to fall.

I am perfectly aware that I am perceived as a good teacher by some, and as one who is not worth his salary by others. These two opposite perceptions don't even have to be seen as contradictory in themselves as they reflect just different degrees of interactions, expectations and demands. As mentioned earlier, I was learning the most from those people with whom I did not get along well, and those who made my life difficult. I consider it important to tell students what I think of their work, even if they end up disliking me and subsequently switch classes or even change school. I do have some cases in mind of former students who looked for a more nurturing environment and found it elsewhere, though soon after school they ended up as lost and alone with their work as before. In contrast to this approach, I propose the following manifesto for art students.

Ad hoc Manifesto for Art Students

ONE

Do what you want to do, no matter what it is. Have fun.

TWO

Whatever you do, it should have something to do with yourself and with your own interests, and not with much else. There is no need to imitate professors, current art trends, anything *chic* or anything trendy.

THREE

Learn just whatever you need to know. Don't buy into the idea of learning some or many techniques first and then going on to do your own stuff. When you need to learn something, learn it by doing. If you don't have anything to say, just don't bother trying to say it. Be happy if you have to learn in an autodidactic manner. It might be even more promising, if the stuff of your interests is not something offered in your art school. Saying this, I do not want to neglect all the great things art students can learn from regular art teachers and their work places.

FOUR

The social environment – including the faculty and visiting artists – one encounters on a campus is the most important thing an art school offers. Embrace it fully, but there is no need to run after people ahead of you. Instead, work with the people who want to work with you and create relationships with whoever you can, independent of their standing in the hierarchic pecking order of the given context. All good things derive from you and from the students around you, but don't expect much else. Organize yourself socially.

FIVE

Re-define success. Every work, every career looks different if it's really worth the adventure. You have to define for yourself what you want, what you can handle and what you really need. You have to decide, on your own, what success constitutes for you. Be aware of the difference between how you feel and see yourself, and how you are perceived by others. Often, artists tend to fluctuate too easily between exuberance, arrogance and depression.

SIX

Accept anti-illusionary education. Embrace a no-future situation. As a second-hand Lacanian might formulate it, love your wounds and keep offering what you can't deliver. Education is love, love is education. Loosen up. Accept being a loser. Enjoy all the bliss.

SEVEN – ECONOMICS

Don't depend on sales. Try to fix your economic basis otherwise. With few exceptions, artists who want to succeed always find a way to get by somehow. If not, memorize

Franz Kafka's "Hunger artist" and recite it for money or move to Leipzig for as long as it remains dirt cheap. There is always a Brooklyn of the early 1990s, a Berlin of the last fifty years and a Leipzig of the current moment. Let's all meet in Odessa soon.

EIGHT

Art and the reception of art is a question of time. There are a very few young artists who can cut it all short and hit some kind of jackpot at a very young age, though they may pay a price for it when prices are not sustainable and the downfall becomes graphic. The great curators, collectors, museum directors and art dealers of the future are most likely studying next to you and look all alike. It is normal to always feel voiceless, powerless, and in need of those who look like they have it all. But ignore all this nonsense.

FINAL MUSIC – YOU GOT THE POWER...

Power is nonsense in the sense that it doesn't exist by itself. It results from all participants in a given game, a given context. Power always shifts, travels, transforms itself and visits anyone who doesn't give up ahead of time and capitulate. Today's *Macher*, today's movers and shakers, and great artists were yesterday's students and most likely felt as irrelevant as art students usually feel when it comes to questions of success and power. There is no need to suck up to those ahead and disregard colleagues and peers who enter the circuit later. This self-defeating and unpleasant behavior is unfortunately the predominant style in the art world, and is often detectable already in art schools.

The best way to escape this trap is to organize things oneself and do it with one's peers and friends. Students really shouldn't be bothered with much else but their own practices and activities because only if they manage to connect with themselves and their own generation will they be able to take over from those ahead of them. Every generation will create their own stars and find somebody to fill the role of the curator, collector, and art dealer. Anyone may come to play a role in this vast network of whispers, opinions, and up-and-down mouthing that so much influences all these various decision-making processes that we feel so dependent upon. The wheel of generational succession will never stop turning.

HAPPY END

The bigger the frustrations, the boredom and ignorance with what people define as successful art, the better and easier it is to break in with better, different and more exciting art. Hence, we don't need to complain anymore. Let's just be really happy and celebrate the fact that there will always be amazing art works made. Their time will come.

New York and Leipzig 2014

PS: Please, note my teaching project entitled "Strange teaching" which functions as a (no)/low cost traveling alternative to any traditional art academy: www.strangeteaching.info.

Dialogue

PARSE: This first issue of the new journal is devoted to the question of judgement. In inviting your contribution we, the editorial team, were mindful of your sustained engagement with the questions of education – especially your brilliant 1997 piece *Education Complex* and the show you curated around this also. We were also mindful of your humorous and pointed critique of celebrity-intellectual culture (public-intellectual as spectacle) in your paparazzi shots of leading intellectual figures. We were especially interested to hear your thoughts on the question of judgement within the educational complex. The text you have presented is riddled with judgements: judgements on particular educators – or at least your personal encounters with those educators; judgements on the appropriate behaviours of students and recent graduates from art school; judgement as something that the student must already have and so exercise in deciding what to make art with / about etc.

At times you insist on the necessity of the teacher producing judgement on the student's work (and the need for that judgement to be unrestricted by concerns for the possible hurt-feelings of the student or the possible unpopularity of the teacher with students, etc.). On the one hand, the need for the students' judgement suggests that judgement cannot be taught as such, on the other hand the emphasis on the teachers demonstrations of judgement suggest that the teacher does indeed teach judgement: What is your position? Should the teacher in an art education attempt to teach judgement? Can we avoid teaching judgement, as in some sense the hidden curriculum of our teaching practices, where we are always unwittingly transmitting judgement and the students are unwittingly learning judgement from us?

RG: The moment I am introduced as a teacher, students start demanding judgements and they engage in reading and deciphering all forms of giving judgements even though I might give only "comments." This is obviously a dangerous game, but people try to squeeze judgements – I keep using this term now - from any kind of reaction from me. Needless to say, I try to behave "unteacherly" because I naively (kind of) envy my students for all the fun, the misery, the desperation and releases they have in parties and irresponsible behavior that only youth, insecurity and non-engagement can justify. But yes, students demand judgements from me and I usually provide it even if I risk attracting unpleasant reactions. Only yesterday, an ex-student came by, and showed me his work though I didn't ask for it. After not commenting he lashed out on me with the passive-aggressive slur: "This is why you are a bad teacher!" I knew how much he wanted to hear from me, and how strong his reactions to my judgment always were, hence, I tried everything to avoid any conflict. I finally ended up speaking for two hours about his work and about himself, on a beautiful Berlin vacation day. The last critique I gave him in my class made him switch Art School which, of course, he also doesn't fully admit. "I needed something more nurturing and didn't leave because of you..."

In order to avoid these hypersensitive reactions, I usually introduce the framework on which my judgements have grown, and on which they have also partially degenerated. For example, I tell them because of my introduction to *A, B, and C* in the year *XX* under the social, media and political conditions of *YMY* I have come to the conclusions *TYCxcZ778CA*. Needless to say, it can get very complicated and variable.

4. The line “My uncle has got barn, we can still put on the show” and variants are apocryphal, but they indicate the basic drive of the Hollywood *Babes in Arms* series of movies from the 1930s (in part, reflexive works on the entertainment industry) and the kind of mythos of talented youngsters just getting their stuff to happen with their own immediate means and energies.

Giving you a more practical and more graphical answer, I’d like to say that I teach *judgement relativism* as a kind of *judgement constructivism* that moves along a long and meandering path of a multi-layered *judgement contingency plan*. But the real task is to hand over this responsibility to the students themselves, so that they can make their own judgment based on their own experiences, responsibilities and needs and so that they can justify their judgement reasoning according to their own logics.

Concluding, let me also say, I would never “teach judgement” but instead try to feed people with knowledge and experiences so students can start their own uphill battles for their consequential judgements. Along the way I might throw them into confusion by confronting them with as many “good and bad” (according to “my judgement”) judgements as I can. Again, I never use the word “judgement”, and don’t necessarily feel a need for it, but I am aware that any position, any comment, any “liking” or “not-liking” including any “ignoring of something” is a judgemental speech act.

PARSE: In your overall instruction to the students at Art School – to learn for themselves, to engage horizontally with peers, create their own scene – you seem to be echoing a particular mythos of “talent will out” familiar from the 1990s rhetoric about the British YBA phenomena and Hans Ulrich Obrist’s repeated story of having his first exhibition in his kitchen etc. There is a recurrence of this particular narrative of success-through-authentic-action - think of Mickey Rooney and Judy Garland,

“My uncle has got a barn, we can still put the show on”⁴ – and the well-rehearsed stories of artist movements and groups, who are supposed to function as self-sustaining micro-cultures in marginal spaces and economies, and then get “picked up” or become celebrated by the art system through new found market exposure or through validation in museum shows or through subsequent valorization in criticism and art history etc. This story is constantly rehearsed in popular media (X Factor, America’s Got Talent, etc.), where talent will out through sustained personal conviction and authentic investment in one’s art. This narrative occludes the political economy of the various systems – Hollywood, R&D in the music industry and the construction of the music charts, the capitalization of, and speculative investment in, artistic production in the contemporary art system(s) – where the operation of, and the selectivity of, the market/fair/biennial/museum/journal system is effectively obscured. In a very summary sense, are we not thereby obscuring from the art-student the actual dynamics of the art system in favour of a kind of double-edged rationalization? By double-edged is meant that, on the one hand, there is a Darwinian logic of “survival of the most fit (to-make-art)” and, on the other hand, that any “failure” has simply been a failure to define success in one’s own terms?

RG: I do not see any contradiction in your two handed opposition: Those who seem to engage in the smartest way, will acquire the most practical, social and theoretical knowledge to prevail in whatever sense, and create their own structures, their own spaces with their

own audiences and economies. But the pendulum is now already swinging back, if we ask the question where all this strength is coming from? My answer will in most cases hint towards the detection of some intrinsic qualities, interests and *talents* – if you allow the word without me having an idea of what it could all fully imply – that are not just mindlessly Darwinian, but an inspiration for success on one’s own terms. Failure is hence not just a failure to define success but a lack of energy, social reinforcement and belief that it is worth the game, the play, the struggle, the costs, the fun. I myself simply don’t see much of a separation between the qualities of the art, and the qualities of kicking down the rotten ball – sorry, I mean art – across all these times and spaces. If you give up, you give up and need not ask who to blame.

PARSE: Your basic argument that the student should not care for the teachers’ “love” is a very provocative and a very important one. It references a very ancient theme in educational thinking about the love between “master” and “student” – going back to traditions of Greek *paideia* and so forth. Within the psychoanalytic tradition, reflection on pedagogical exchange has consistently thematised the question of “affect” and the “transferences” between student and teacher. Is it really possible for any teacher, or any student, to enter the field of affective relations and transferences between the one-presumed-to-not-know or to-want-knowing and the one-presumed-to-know without taking these flows of affect as somehow critical and definitive conditions of, and occasions of, learning in themselves? Or is your teaching a demand for the self-disciplin-

ing of affects, for professional distancing from affective entanglements?

RG: I might have given the wrong impression. It is impossible not to be affected, attracted or repulsed by any meaningful teacher-student relationship but what I would like to say is that one needs not to overemphasize the emotional and cathetic aspects of this relationship. In fact, if you want to fall in love and find reciprocity do so, and if you encounter nothing but rejection and weirdness, but still learn something, don’t leave. I am certainly the last person to encourage affective distancing – quite the opposite, I feel that we are all family: As in the song, “*love is all we need*” and I would complement that with the need also for beauty and knowledge based on our interests, desires and politics.

PARSE: Can you talk a little bit more about “Strange teaching”: www.strangeteaching.info. We wondered if this might also be understood as a kind of corrective research project – an enquiry into alternate models of educational practice, embedded within the terms of art practice, rather than “about” art practice?

RG: The *strange teaching* Leipzig project (and there should be a Bushwick, NYC version in 2015) is certainly both – art practice and “about” art practice – depending on how you read and perceive it, and depending on who is engaged in it. In Leipzig, it fulfilled different tasks and opportunities for lecturers, performers, students, visitors and guests. The special characteristics of this experiment consisted in the openness of the format and its results, as well as

5. The reference here is to *Survivor*, a franchised reality TV game show, that has been produced in many countries throughout the world. In the show, contestants are isolated (sometimes on an island) and compete for cash and other prizes. The show uses a system of progressive elimination, allowing the contestants to vote off other tribe members until only one final contestant remains and wins the game.

in the instability of its model and the fragility of its success. Leipzig's former Held department store was an illegal semi-squatted, uninhabitable, uninviting, dirty space with no heating, no electricity, no clean water, where people lived, worked, performed and showed work for the duration of two weeks. It was a semi-secret extravaganza with daily events, teach-ins and performances that excited everybody and resulted in a show, an on-line presence, Instagram video clips and Twitter feeds, a publication (currently in production) and a good portion of myth; not to mention the beautiful images and memories that people hopefully have, as I do, of the project,

The remarkable thing about Leipzig consisted in getting many interesting people involved who all came without any budget. In that respect, the next iteration in New York City should even add to the fun and excitement. Also the contrast to the city's regular fine art education economics might be as dazzling as the potential access to the unlimited pool of mind-staggering talent in New York. Again, the curatorial and selective mode will be simply the invitations I extend to artist friends who in return invite their students. In Leipzig, programming was enriched by spontaneously inviting people from nearby Berlin. With a certain critical mass and buzz, people were pleased by these *autopoetic* activities.

Given the fun it all was, I have now become even more interested to organize, stage, host and share opportunities with a 'Just-do-it' attitude, without letting myself be scared by today's planning hustles or costs. I admit, from a contemporary, well-sanitized and regulated perspective, *strange teaching* was irresponsible, illegal, and even potentially hazardous as you cannot invite one hundred people into an unprepared, shut down ruin and just say "just do it": But that is exactly what I did, rejecting even any personal, or institutional, responsibility. It was, for sure, a daring experiment and one that was worth taking. Bushwick today is not Leipzig, but Bushwick will also have some of its own interesting challenges that I will need to overcome.

Of course, Leipzig was not an artificially staged *Survivor Island* reality show⁵ but the result of a no budget situation and some lucky circumstances as this former defunct department store became somehow generative. New York will be staged in a more organized environment, since everything is productive and regulated in this high cost living and working area where no spaces are left alone for long without being used for profit. I believe in people and their intrinsic interest in exchange, curiosity, love and need for communication and lived-through-and-told stories.

Notice of Issue #2

The Value of Contemporary Art

Editors: Jason E. Bowman, Suhail Malik and Andrea Phillips

It's now a truism that the contemporary art market plays a fundamental role in the commissioning and display of contemporary art outside of the market (be it through patronage or in the informal subsidizing of the public sector). The privatisation of art's financing is complex and cannot be separated from either the modes of speculation currently dominant in global economics nor the ways in which artists, curators, and critics are educated and professionalised. Identification, analysis, and responses to such a condition are severely hampered by the lack of publicly available systemic and formal information.

This example of the centrality of art's market to its public dissemination impacts not simply upon artists' support structures but also upon the ways in which their work is multiply valued. Measurement of any value (cultural, aesthetic or monetary) in the arts has been at best occasional, anecdotal, and disparate. Indeed, proposals to introduce systemic analysis and measurement into contemporary art are often treated with suspicion by those who oppose art's regulation as yet another infringement of accountability to metrics that, in turn, deny the idea that art's value is unmeasurable. Production in other artistic disciplines – theatre, music, dance, design – have differently organised financial support systems, but all rely on the idea of intrinsic cultural value, and all are affected by the on-going decreases in public funding in Europe and the US over the last four decades that previously upheld the non-measurability of artistic value. How does this economic and subjective transformation affect concepts of value in the arts and how might making transparent arts' financing change these concepts of value?

Ongoing and historically embedded privatisations of financial knowledge do not simply affect artistic production but the fields that support and work in parallel to it. How does the informal model of value-measurement within the arts sector produce the conditions that are in themselves marketised by the greater cultural economy? What and where are alternative or complementary methods of non-economic value creation being rehearsed? How do such disputed measurements of

value affect artistic research, a field that is itself often criticised as a containment and academicisation of artistic creativity? Academic research funding in Europe is increasingly governed by metrics; how does this system contrast with the usually informal structure of patronage in the arts? What emerges as a market for humanities and design research through the academic pursuit of entrepreneurial and business models? How does the apparent conflict of the qualitative with the quantitative affect how artists – and those who think about them – measure up in determining the qualification of value of art?

Debate on the qualitative as an alternative means by which to recognise, produce and describe emphasis on non-metricised modes of value creation and perception has led to consideration of how qualitative methodologies may suggest different ways to think through and evidence value and values. These have focussed on means to attend to and describe the experiential within contemporary art, its production, circulation and display including within artistic research processes. The qualitative has become implicated also in debates regarding relational, participatory, communitarian, activist and educational initiatives that engage with expanded notions of transaction between different disciplines, practices and between artists and 'non-artists.'

Contributors include Richard Birkett, Alberto Lopez Cuenca, Goldin + Senneby, Hannah Newell, Lisa Soskolne, Donna Yates, Katleen Vermeir and Ronny Heiremans.

Notice of Issue #3

Repetitions and Reneges: Interpretation, iteration, and re-performance across the arts.

Editors: Darla Crispin, Anders Hultqvist and Cecilia Lagerström

The possibility of repetition in general, and more specifically repetition or reiteration of artistic work raises questions that emerge, and are negotiated differently, across the various art fields. This is because these various art fields are connected to divergent practices and conceptions of tradition, authorship, interpretation, ownership, originality, performativity and artistry.

The issues that might be addressed under the heading of “repetitions and reneiges” range from the relation to repetition and reiteration in theatre and dance practices to non-repeating strategies in performance art; from the legitimate interpretation of canonical works within various music traditions to the re-performance of improvisational practices; from the vogue for re-enactments in contemporary art to the construction of poetic texts exclusively from explicit or implicit citations of other works; from the normalisation of appropriation in some visual arts and literary practices to the scandal of subsequent performances that deviate from interpretive standards in some areas of the performing arts; from the reinterpretative acts of appropriation within design and architecture to the iterative momentum inherent in craft; from the politics of preservation and reclamation in some cultural heritage practices to the rhetorics of post-memory and the intrinsically contested nature of any re-construction of the past; from the tensions incurred through the proliferation of documentation simultaneous with the “weakening” ontology of the individual work of art to the complex aesthetic and epistemic quandaries thrown up by the attempt to construct “living” archives of ephemeral and evanescent practices.

These questions of repetition touch upon both the philosophical themes of intention, tradition, identity, individuation, type and event and the performative themes of ownership, style, oeuvre and artistic agency. Within, for instance, theatre and (classical) musical interpretation there are often strong tendencies to police the legitimate interpretational possibilities of canonical works. These works are for some critically proscribed from realisation outside a predefined set of performance strategies. The third issue of PARSE comprises research submissions that operate within this complex space of repetition or reiteration of works of art and of artistic practices.

About Peer-Review

PARSE Journal employs a peer review process that is designed in order to: (i) establish suitability for publication in terms of content, relevance and quality; and (ii) provide critical feedback to enable contributors to finalise material for publication. Each contribution submitted to *PARSE Journal* is reviewed by at least three readers in the pre-publication process: a member of the

editorial team for the particular issue number (the article editor); a member of the editorial board; and an external reader.

The peer review process is based on an open review process (it is not double blind as normally employed in many of the natural sciences for example). The full list of reviewers will be identified via the PARSE website annually. In all cases reviewers and the authors will be asked to disclose any possible conflict of interest. After approval for publication has been established through the peer review process, a finalized version of the contribution will be provided by the author(s) in correspondence with the article editor.

We regret, that it is not possible for the editorial team to enter into dialogue or provide feedback for all submissions. Typically this is reserved for those submissions that have been identified as suitable for potential publication in the particular volume number.

PARSE Journal accepts proposals for publication on a rolling basis and potential contributors are invited to consider the open calls for material published on the *PARSE Journal* website: www.parsejournal.com

PARSE Conference on Time

The first biennial PARSE conference at the Faculty of Fine, Applied and Performing Arts, University of Gothenburg, Sweden will take place on the 5th and 6th November 2015. The conference takes as its point of departure the question of *time*. Confirmed Keynote Speakers include: Jalal Toufic, Coco Fusco, Simonetta Carbonaro and Bruno Latour.

Time has always been at the center of the research initiatives of the natural sciences, of philosophy and of the many different practices of history and social criticism. However, time also occupies a central place for the curiosity and attention of artist researchers across all the arts. The intensification of the question of time has, in recent years, prompted some to speak of a "temporal turn" across the disciplines. This conference seeks to bring together a range of researchers, drawn mainly from the artistic fields but also inviting researchers from across all disciplines to consider questions with respect to the practices, processes and perturbations of time.

Topics addressed during the conference include: constructions of contemporaneity; time and the aesthetic; time and affect; queer times; chronopolitics; durational practices; public time; temporal imaginaries and ecological practices; and the time of the poem. A selection of contributions will be further developed for publication through a future issue of the *PARSE Journal*.

For more information, and to register for the conference, please see www.parsejournal.com/conference/

Early registration fee applies until 1st July 2015.